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EXPECTATIONS OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS 
Marek M. Sipko 
Old Dominion University, May 2010 
Director: Dr. John M. Ritz 
This study evaluated the effectiveness of the U.S. Marine Corps combat 
operational stress preventive training program to determine whether the program meets 
the training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. This evaluation entailed both 
qualitative and quantitative inquiries to answer the subject matter research questions. 
The participants consisted of active duty and reserve Marines on active duty. For 
the purposes of the quantitative analysis, the researcher obtained a random sample of 480 
Marines. Additionally, the researcher obtained a purposefully stratified qualitative sample 
of 12 active duty Marines consisting of four junior non-commissioned Marines, four staff 
non-commissioned officers, and four commissioned officers. 
Since this study involved both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, there 
were three data collection instruments. Regarding the quantitative inquiry, an online 
based survey was utilized. This survey contained a number of Likert scale type questions 
built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level training evaluation constructs: reaction, 
learning, changed behavior, and long-term results. Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the 
researcher conducted interviews using an interview protocol form, which consisted of a 
number of open-ended interview questions related to the effectiveness of the combat 
operational stress preventive training. Additionally, the researcher conducted four 
i i i 
qualitative observations of training sessions using an observation protocol 
instrument/checklist. 
For the purposes of the quantitative analysis, both descriptive and inferential 
statistical methods were used. The descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to 
organize, summarize, and describe the associated data. The logistic regression models 
provided the researcher the opportunities to make predictions about the characteristics of 
the Marine Corps population. 
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed the majority of 
the Marines, regardless of rank, did not reacted favorably to the currently formatted 
combat operational stress preventive training; some Marines learned the basics of the 
training; most of the Marines did not apply the learned preventive skills in their daily 
lives; and the current long-term combat operational stress preventive training program for 
both the enlisted Marines and the officers had not been a success as evidenced by a 
number of significant logistic regressions, further supported by descriptive statistics, and 
triangulated by qualitative interviews and training observations. Additionally, the 
respondents' self-reported experiences of effects from combat operational stress do affect 
their evaluation of the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training 
as evidenced by several significant logistic regressions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Men and women who participate in combat or who deploy to military operations 
in support of combat could be affected by combat related experiences including combat 
operational stress (Nash, 2007). Current ongoing combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have caused tremendous amounts of grief, terror, courage, honor, and self-
sacrifice to our Nation's troops. Additionally, the specific characteristics of the current 
American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as unclear enemy lines and the use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs, can place great psychological 
strain on combatants (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006). 
Currently, most American combat deployments involve counterinsurgency or 
unconventional warfare efforts. A central strategy of insurgency efforts is to exploit soft 
vulnerabilities within an opponent due to the prior conclusion that the enemy cannot be 
defeated in direct or sustained confrontations (Nagl, 2005). Insurgents do selectively 
target and engage military forces, but within the larger aim of defeating enemy decision 
makers and their political will (Hammes, 2004). The violent and unpredictable manner in 
which these unconventional attacks occur is designed to create fear, uncertainty, 
helplessness, and ultimately, demoralization (Everly & Castellano, 2004), establishing a 
battleground for the mind and will in which American service members must engage 
daily. When insurgent attacks originate from within populated areas and the enemy is 
able to quickly reconstitute back into these same surroundings, military personnel face 
the difficult task of having to discern appropriate engagement responses in real-time 
scenarios. Often, the split-second decision-making conundrum of conservative in 
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opposition to aggressive responsiveness is tempered by prior losses from an enemy 
seemingly operating without adherence to any rules of engagement. Further, the 
unconventional nature of these attacks, via improvised explosive devices (IEDs), distant 
rocket or mortar attacks, and planned ambushes within civilian settings, accentuates the 
frustration of not being able to strike back directly and decisively. In these situations, the 
service members must overcome the aggravations inherent in being both goodwill 
ambassador and a combat soldier or Marine, and the difficulty of separating combatants 
from civilians. In addition, service members must overcome constant environmental 
threats to their safety while jointly managing internal assaults to instinctive desires for 
control and predictability (Everly & Castellano, 2004). Both factors can significantly 
undermine individual stress-resilience efforts (Everly & Castellano, 2004). 
Combat operational stress significantly contributes to the loss of fighting force 
and negatively affects military readiness leading to suicide, multiple psychosocial 
problems, and pre-normal end of military service (Nash, 2007). Post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) has been associated with combat operational stress (National Institute 
for Mental Health [NIMH], 2008). Post-traumatic stress disorder is defined as an anxiety 
disorder that can develop after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave 
physical harm occurred (NIMH, 2008). According to Defense Medical Epidemiology 
Database (DMED), the number of new PTSD diagnosis cases for active duty Marines has 
been growing each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (Defense 
Medical Surveillance System [DMSS], 2009). 
Exposures to stress can be compared to trees subjected to winds. Most of the 
trees subjected to prevailing winds adapt by bending away from the direction of such 
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winds. Some trees, however, will not adapt and will simply snap and break. Similar 
reactions occur in human beings. Some stronger individuals, when subjected by stress, 
will adapt and adjust. They will become stronger and will continue to exhibit courage, 
honor, and self-sacrifice. However, some individuals will not adapt and could even 
develop mental stress related injuries. Stress injuries are permanent although their effects 
can be decreased by care of mental health professionals. Normal stress reactions account 
for about 70 percent of all stress cases (Nash, 2007). The remaining 30 percent is divided 
between temporary stress injuries (20 percent) and stress illnesses (10 percent) (Nash, 
2007). The goal is to prevent the temporary stress injuries by instituting strong stress 
prevention training activities and quickly identifying and treating stress illnesses. 
Current ongoing combat operations brought attention to the need for combat 
operational stress control interventions. However, the evidence of negative stress 
reactions, like increases in post-traumatic stress disorder cases, has made the case for 
stronger and more vigorous efforts for prevention and restoration of combat operational 
stress casualties (NIMH, 2008). Although a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary preventive 
health approach is not a new concept, it has been minimally employed in respect to 
combat operational stress control and military mental health programs. Department of 
Defense directed all services to design and implement combat operational stress control 
programs. Such programs should include a preventive training to preserve the mission 
effectiveness and warfighting abilities and minimize the short and long-term adverse 
effects of combat on the physical, psychological, intellectual, and social health of service 
members (Department of Defense, 1999). According to the Defense Medical 
Epidemiology Database (2009), the current Marine Corps combat operational stress 
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preventive training has been ineffective as evidenced by rising combat operational stress 
casualties (DMSS, 2009). This study will evaluate this claim and make recommendations 
for improvements. 
Statement of Problem 
This study evaluated the effectiveness of the U.S. Marine Corps combat 
operational stress preventive training program to determine whether the program meets 
the training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. 
Research Questions 
The following were research questions used to guide this study: 
1. To what extent do the respondents' self-reported experiences of effects 
from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training? 
2. To what extent does the combat operational stress preventive training 
program for Marine officers meet the training effectiveness criteria of the 
Marine Corps? 
3. To what extent does the combat operational stress preventive training 
program for enlisted Marines meet the training effectiveness criteria of the 
Marine Corps? 
Background and Significance 
The Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control branch 
director suggested this study because of the need to evaluate the combat operational • 
stress preventive training program. This study is also significant because it concerns our 
Nation's troops. The Combat Operational Stress Control branch office is relatively new, 
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and the combat operational stress preventive training program has never been formally 
evaluated (Gaskin, 2008). Additionally, it would be difficult to develop a more effective 
combat operational stress preventive training program without first understanding the 
sense and meaning of the individual experiences of Marines who perceived this 
preventive training as effective or ineffective. Using insights from this research, Combat 
Operational Stress Control branch officers may improve their prevention program 
methodology thus positively contribute to the preservation of the Marine Corps forces. 
This action could also directly benefit our Nation's combat Marines and soldiers. 
Theoretical significances for this study entailed investigating relationships between 
research variables and proposing research data collection instruments. These documents 
could also be used as templates for follow on investigations. 
Practical significances of the study included creating training evaluation 
methodologies. Such methodologies could also be used by other military and civilian 
training and education entities. Since this study focused on individual experiences, it may 
provide other researchers with insights essential for constructing quantitative instruments 
that could aid in predicting those being affected by combat operational stress. 
Additionally, the study may provide other researchers with additional empirical 
knowledge which could be used in evaluating other training and education activities. 
Theoretical Contributions 
First, the study tested the theory which guided its design. The study investigated 
the relationship between reaction to training, learning, knowledge transfer, long-term 
results of training, and individual perceptions whether the training was effective or 
ineffective. These relationships were proposed by Kirkpatrick's (2006) Four Levels of 
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Training Evaluation model: (1) reaction, (2) learning, (3) knowledge transfer, and (4) 
long-term results. Information presented in this study could benefit future research to 
produce predictive models of training effectiveness. 
Second, the study delved into the effectiveness of combat operational stress 
preventive training expanding on findings of other combat operational stress researchers 
(Hoge et al., 2002; Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting, & Koffman, 2004; Hoge et 
al., 2006; Nash, 2006; Stevens, 2006; Iribarren, Prolo, Neagos, & Chiappelli, 2005; 
Smith, Ryan, Wingard, Slymen, Sallis, & Kritz-Silverstein, 2008; Iversen, Fear, & 
Ehlers, 2008). The other studies have focused more on determining whether service 
members are susceptible to combat operational stress when exposed to combat and high 
operational tempo. There is very little discussion of the existing preventive combat 
operational stress preventive training and education practices. On the other hand, this 
study evaluates the preventive aspect of combat operational stress, which when executed 
properly should keep the majority of Marines and soldiers mentally healthy and free of ill 
effects of combat operational stress. 
Practical Significance 
The most significant practical contribution of this study was the creation of the 
combat operational stress preventive training evaluation template which includes surveys 
and questionnaires built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) evaluation of training effectiveness 
constructs. Such materials are available for use by the U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 
and other major Marine Corps supported commands (I, II, and III Marine Expeditionary 
Forces) in evaluating their respective preventive combat operational stress preventive 
training and education programs. Each of the used data collection instruments was 
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evaluated by independent Ph.D. experts for training evaluation efficacy, and later resulted 
in statistically significant findings. Since the study's results are based on scientific 
principles, the study's methodology could be replicated in evaluating other training 
activities. 
Limitations 
This study presents several limitations relating to participants and the subject 
matter: 
1. The study was focused exclusively on active duty U.S. Marines. 
2. Preventive Combat Operational Stress Control consisted only of formal 
and informal training instituted and managed by the Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, Combat Operational Stress Control branch. 
3. Full disclosure of the participants' perceptions toward effects of combat 
operational stress and the effectiveness of the combat operational stress 
preventive training might have been hindered by reluctance of the 
individuals to disclose their feelings and opinions completely. 
4. This study included only volunteers as none of the Marine participants 
was forced or ordered to participate in the study. 
Assumptions 
There were several assumptions made in this study. These assumptions had to 
hold true for the study to answer its research questions. The following were the 
assumptions: 
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1. The instrumentation used in the study accurately measured effects of 
combat operational stress on Marines and the effectiveness of the combat 
operational stress preventive training. 
2. Marines had equal opportunities to attend combat operational stress 
preventive formal and informal training sessions. 
3. Kirkpatrick's (2006) Four Levels of Training Evaluation model effectively 
measures levels of training effectiveness. 
4. Voluntary respondents truly represent the entire Marine Corps population. 
Procedures 
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, both descriptive and inferential 
statistical methods were used. The descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to 
organize, summarize, and describe the associated data. The inferential statistical methods 
provided predictions about the characteristics of the Marine Corps population. For 
Research Question 1, descriptive statistics were used consisting of frequencies and 
percentages in order to organize, summarize, and describe the data. Binary logistic 
regressions were used to assess the associations between the demographic characteristics, 
training effectiveness variables, and self-reported experiences of effects from combat 
operational stress. For Research Questions 2 and 3, binary logistic regressions were also 
used to assess the associations between biographic characteristics, training effectiveness 
variables, and individual perceptions, whether the training was effective or ineffective. 
The results of these statistical quantitative analyses provided insights to the effectiveness 
of combat operational stress preventive training. 
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Additionally, qualitative analysis of preventive training sessions and individual 
interviews was conducted by investigating individual experiences that gave meaning to 
the individual decision why the combat operational stress preventive training was 
effective or ineffective. Specifically, the collected data were analyzed by using 
interpretational analysis techniques. Interpretational analysis involves systematic 
procedures to code and classify qualitative data to ensure that important themes and 
patterns emerge (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 1999). This qualitative approach allowed Marines' 
individual experiences to speak for themselves providing intrinsic perceptions to the real 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. The 
identification and description of the individual perception of the effectiveness or the 
ineffectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training was one of the 
objectives of this study. 
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions are key terms used to design this study: 
Combat Stress. Changes in physical or mental functioning or behavior due to the 
experience of lethal force or its aftermath. These changes can be positive and adaptive 
(e.g., increased confidence in self and peers), or they can be negative, including distress 
or loss of normal functioning (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2008). 
Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC). Leader-focused actions and responsibilities 
to promote resilience and psychological health in military units and individuals exposed 
to the stress of combat or other military operations (USMC, 2008). 
Mental Health. The absence of significant distress or impairment due to mental illness. 
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Operational Stress Control (OSC). Leader-focused actions and responsibilities to 
promote resilience and psychological health in military units and individuals exposed to 
the stress of routine or wartime military operations in non-combat environments, whether 
at sea, in the air, or on the ground, including support and logistics operations of all kinds 
(USMC, 2008). 
Operational Stress. Changes in mental functioning or behavior, especially distress or loss 
of function, due to the experience of military operations other than combat during 
peacetime or war, and on land, at sea, or in the air (USMC, 2008). 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). An anxiety disorder that can develop after 
exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical harm occurred or was 
threatened (NIMH, 2008). 
Stressor. Any mental or physical challenge or set of challenges (USMC, 2008). 
United States Marine Corps (USMC). Branch of the United States Armed Forces 
responsible for providing force projection from the sea, using the mobility of the U.S. 
Navy, rapidly delivering combined-arms task forces (Global Security, 2009). 
Summary and Overview 
Current ongoing worldwide combat operations underscored the need for 
preventive interventions in Combat Operational Stress Control. The combat operational 
stress preventive training program is an integral part of the U.S. Marine Corps Combat 
Operational Stress Control branch efforts to reduce combat operational stress related 
casualties. This study to evaluate the combat operational stress preventive training 
program originated from Director, Combat Operational Stress Control, U.S. Marine 
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Corps Headquarters and the need to conduct an evaluation of the U.S. Marine Corps 
combat operational stress preventive training program. 
Specifically, the purpose of this study was to confirm the effectiveness of the 
Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education program. By 
utilizing the researcher designed and independently validated survey instruments, the 
researcher obtained descriptive statistics and conducted binary logistic regressions to 
determine to what extent the Marines' self-reported experiences of effects from combat 
operational stress affected their evaluation of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps 
combat operational stress preventive training. Additionally, obtained descriptive statistics 
and binary logistic regressions enabled the researcher to determine the effectiveness of 
the combat operational stress preventive training program for both the enlisted Marines 
and the officers. 
This research also qualitatively investigated and described the individual 
experiences of Marines in regards to the combat operational stress preventive training and 
education services. Particularly, the researcher identified those factors that caused 
Marines to think whether the current combat operational stress preventive training is 
effective or ineffective. These insights provided the program officers with new 
knowledge to improve and implement effective training and education methods. 
Improved combat operational stress preventive training and education practices could 
result in better prevention methodology thus positively influence combat readiness of the 
Marine Corps forces. 
Chapter I presented the problem statement that delineated the need to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training program to determine 
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whether the program meets expectations of the Marine Corps. Chapter II contains a 
literature review. Specific reviewed topics included historical background, overview of 
the combat operational stress concepts, overview of the combat operational stress 
preventive training, overview of the training standards in the Marine Corps, and overview 
of the training effectiveness constructs for assessing knowledge and skills acquisition. 
Chapter III describes the population sample included in the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, followed by design of the survey instruments. Chapter III also included data 
collection methodologies and described the employed statistical analyses. Chapter IV 
describes the actual findings of the study. Chapter V includes the study's summary 




The literature review was conducted by reviewing the subject matter literature in 
order to present the reader with the knowledge-base on combat operational stress and 
evaluation of the combat operational stress preventive training. The review utilized the 
most current issues of journals and other Department of Defense (DoD) sources that dealt 
with matters of combat operational stress and organizational training. The reviewed 
variables included concepts of combat operational stress control to include Post-traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a negative outcome of combat operational stress, the 
institutional efficacy of the U.S. Marine Corps training programs, and the training 
effectiveness evaluation constructs as recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006): reaction, 
learning, knowledge transfer, and results as the overall success of the training program. 
The intent was to provide a thorough synthesis and analysis of literature that concerns 
this study. This was done by reviewing the field, validating the research topic and 
methodology selection, and finally presenting a conceptual basis for the study. 
Historical Background of Combat Operational Stress 
Combat operational stress is not a new concept. Jones (1995) indicated that 18th 
century literature labeled combat stress reactions as "nostalgia". In this sense nostalgia 
means something much more than simple longing for one's home. It rather refers to an 
inability to cope in realities of a military service and thus losing all hopes of returning 
home sound and safe. Jones (1995) indicated that such individuals became extremely 
solitary, lethargic, often losing all internal motivation for honorable military service. The 
primary causes of nostalgia were psychological interwoven with some social 
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underpinnings, but the main causes of it were psychological damnations of being 
permanently taken away from home and loved ones (Jones, 1995). 
During the American Civil War, nostalgia continued to be the most common 
name for combat stress (Dean, 1997). However, many other labels were also used, 
including insanity, sunstroke, and "irritable heart" or "trotting heart" (Dean, 1997). 
Additionally, both combatant armies suffered from frequent desertion cases by battle 
induced panic attacks (Marlowe, 2001). The heart related diagnoses concerned 
occurrences of rapid heart rate at rest which often accompanied these panic attacks 
(Dean, 1997). 
In another study of 300 soldiers from the U.S. Civil War, Da Costa (1871) 
described a condition he called "irritable heart". This condition apparently affected 
soldiers exposed to combat and non-combatant civilians. It was characterized by 
shortness of breath, palpitations, and exertional chest pain, as well as headache and 
dizziness (Da Costa, 1871). Da Costa attributed these conditions to various causes, 
including infectious diseases and stress (Da Costa, 1871). This was a significant change 
in understanding the combat stress theory. Now, it was understood that combat stress 
related mental illnesses could be caused by physical damage to the brain, such as by 
heavy alcohol or drug use (Nash, 2006). 
Toward the end of the 19th century, Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet, two 
physicians who studied mental trauma in civilians, became the supporters of two different 
views of causes behind combat stress: one being the psychological and the second being 
the biological. Both Freud and Janet published the concept of dissociation, currently 
defined as a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, 
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identity, or perception (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), after experiencing a 
traumatic event (Breuer & Freud, 1957/1895; Janet, 1920/1907). Both of these brilliant 
psychologists believed that dissociation was a key element in the development of 
psychopathology after a traumatic experience (Nemiah, 1998). But while Freud saw the 
fragmentation of consciousness in dissociation as a self-protective defense mechanism 
intended to keep overwhelmingly disturbing perceptions or feelings out of consciousness, 
Janet believed separation of emotion was due to an inborn failure to integrate information 
in the brain under the impact of a "violent emotion" (Van der Kolk, Weisaeth, & Van der 
Hart, 1996). In Freud's view, dissociation at the moment of trauma was a "purposeful and 
intentional" choice (Breuer & Freud, 1957/1895, p. 123), although occurred 
unconsciously. On the other hand, Janet thought of dissociation as a symptom of a 
breakdown of brain function, or in other words a loss of adjustment abilities (Van der 
Kolk & Van der Hart, 1989). This difference in theory of causation makes all the 
difference in handling and diagnosis (Nash, 2006). For Freud, conscious recall of 
repressed traumatic memories was therapeutic; for Janet, attempts to recall traumatic 
memories before they were somehow neutralized would only again overcome the brain's 
integrative capacity and cause further breakdown (Nemiah, 1998). 
The series of names or labels describing combat stress in the 20th century is a 
result of ongoing debates between those who believed combat stress reactions were 
psychological in origin, and those who believed combat stress reactions had mainly 
biological derivations (Shephard, 2000). "Shell shock" in the First World War suggested 
the belief, at the time, that the varied negative mental health symptoms seen in the 
trenches of France and Belgium were caused by physical damage to the brain by being 
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close to the explosion of artillery shells. However, efforts to find evidence of physical 
damage to the brain in shell shock cases failed, which probably made people believe in 
the psychological causes of combat stress more so than the physical ones (Nash, 2006). 
Additionally during World War I, a syndrome similar to the one described by Da Costa 
(1871) became a major cause of medical evacuations back to England. It was given 
various names: Da Costa syndrome, soldier's heart, effort syndrome, as the symptoms 
were exacerbated by effort, and in the United States, it was called neurocirculatory 
asthenia (Hyams, Wignall, & Roswell, 1996). 
Although the identification of "neurasthenia", which means an exhaustion of the 
nervous system, was used in both world wars, the purely psychological references to ill 
effects of combat stress as "traumatic neurosis" and "war neurosis" gained prominence in 
WW II (Shephard, 2000). "Neurosis" was a concept which grew out of the Freudian 
psychoanalytic movement in the early twentieth century, defined as symptoms produced 
by "emergency discharges" of psychic energy accumulated by unconscious conflict 
(Fenichel, 1945, p. 20). Shell shock and neurasthenia were considered "hardware" 
problems; war neurosis was thought to be a "software" problem (Nash, 2006). As WW II 
neared, the most commonly used labels were "battle fatigue" and "exhaustion," both 
reflecting a psychological rather than a biological etiology (Nash, 2006). Citing war 
psychiatry experience in both world wars, Kormos asserted in 1978, "fortunately, it is a 
relatively settled matter. All sources appear nowadays to be in agreement that we are 
dealing with a functional entity" (Kormos, 1978, p. 12). 
After the Vietnam War, a plethora of research on persistent combat stress related 
disorders led to the official recognition in 1980 of post-traumatic stress disorder 
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(American Psychiatric Association, 1980). At the same time, American psychiatry 
predominately adopted the "Biopsychosocial Model," an integrative theory based on the 
principle that all mental and behavioral problems have concurrent causes in the 
biological, psychological, and social spheres (Engel, 1980). Since then, PTSD has 
become a paradigm of a true biopsychosocial disorder, with well-documented physical, 
mental, and interpersonal components (Litz, 2006). 
During the Gulf War, there was an amazingly low rate of negative combat stress 
cases seen during both the air war phase and the ground combat phase (Garland, 1993). 
Some of the causes that attributed to the low rate of mental health problems included the 
lack of easy access to alcohol and drugs; the victorious and clear-cut outcome of the 
operation; the outstanding support from home; and the rapid redeployment of combat 
troops out of the area of operations (Garland, 1993). These factors are vital to remember 
as they constitute an important paradigm for the low incidences of negative combat stress 
reactions. Additionally, one of the legacies of the Gulf War was to place preventive teams 
consisting of psychologists, social workers, and other mental health professionals with 
the units deployed to combat zones. This best practice program undoubtedly helped 
preventing a number of mental health problems thus contributing to the reported low rate 
of mental health incidences during and after the Gulf War (Doyle, 2000). 
Currently, there are preventive mental health assets deployed throughout Iraq and 
Afghanistan providing preventive and acute mental health services. However, both the 
U.S. Army and the Marine Corps have seen resurgence of mental health problems 
following combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan (Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et al , 
2006; Smith, Ryan, Wingard, Slymen, Sallis, & Kritz-Silverstein, 2008). Time will tell 
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the full significance of these conflicts in terms of combat stress and how combat stress 
affects individual service members. 
Coping with Combat Operational Stress 
Effectively coping with combat operational stress is the overarching outcome of 
the combat operational stress preventive training (Gaskin, 2008). Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) defined coping as "constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to 
manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or 
exceeding the resources of the person" (p. 141). The actual goals of coping, in their view, 
are "managing emotions and maintaining self-esteem and a positive outlook, especially in 
the face of irremediable situations" (p. 139). The goal of coping is not merely to survive a 
severe stress, but to go beyond it through courage, resourcefulness, and personal growth. 
Successful coping not only manages distress and hardships (Lazarus, 1999), but finds 
meaning in it (Frankl, 1984). 
Service members in a war zone can be unbelievably resourceful in their 
development and employment of coping strategies (Nash, 2006). For example, writing 
letters has long been a valuable tool for deployed service members to not only retain 
contact with loved ones back home, but to conceptualize their experiences into coherent 
narratives in order to find meanings in them. E-mail has raised the coping strategy of 
"letters from the front" to a new level of propinquity and impact. Digital cameras and 
video recorders have also permitted service members to create photo and video journals 
of their experiences, often set to purposefully selected music to provide personal 
connotation. However, giving support to fellow combatants and receiving support from 
them continue to reign as the ultimate of battlefield coping strategies (Nash, 2006). 
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Relationships made in combat zones may be the most reflective and honest of any 
that service members will ever have in their lives. Amazingly, humor and play continue 
to thrive in the war zone, even under the most terrible of circumstances. Additionally, 
many deployed service members experience an epiphany of religious faith that can do 
miracles to neutralize the toxic effects of combat operational stress (Elder & Clipp, 
1988). One of the most humanizing experiences possible in a war zone is the mere 
conscious knowledge that, however much one may be pummeled by external factors 
outside of one's control, there are always choices to be made. And these choices may not 
only save lives, but give meaning to otherwise confused experiences (Nash, 2006). 
The value of social support in adaptation to extreme stress cannot be 
underestimated. Just as families, under ideal conditions, provide shelter, love, 
compassion, and guidance for family members, relationships in cohesive military units 
are vital to the survival of each individual in them. Shared danger intensifies bonding, 
partly because each person's survival lies literally in the hands of his peers (Elder & 
Clipp, 1988). The resulting close social association neutralizes intense, depressing 
emotions, and makes each dangerous encounter seem less threatening (Cohen, Gottlieb, 
& Underwood, 2000). 
Effective military leaders can also encourage adaptation in their junior Marines 
and sailors to extreme stress, under ideal conditions. For example, Grossman (1995) 
associated a successful military leader with a "well of fortitude" into which juniors could 
repeatedly tap in to restore their own deteriorating courage. Of course, relationships can 
also have a negative impact on adaptation (Lazarus, 1999). Service members who are 
newly joined to their units, such as replacements for combat losses, may have a 
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particularly hard time since they might be initially excluded from the sustaining network 
of attachments in the unit. And to the extent service members depend on attachments in 
their units for their emotional survival, they are susceptible to a disastrous failure of 
adaptation if those attachments are suddenly lost (Elder & Clipp, 1988). 
Negative Effects of Combat Operational Stress 
The effect of combat on the mental health of military personnel has been a cause 
for great concern among the public, military leaders, and policy-makers. Psychological 
disorders in military populations have had a menacing impact on the readiness and the 
accomplishment of military goals (Hoge et al., 2002; Hoge et al., 2006). Specific 
characteristics of the current American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as 
unclear enemy lines, and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside 
bombs, can place great psychological strain on combatants. It is extremely important to 
have effective preventive services in place such as training and education to minimize the 
number of actual cases of psychological disorders. 
Operational and combat stress contributes significantly to the loss of fighting 
forces and negatively affects military readiness while leading to suicide, multiple 
psychosocial problems, and pre-normal end of military service (Nash, 2006). One of the 
key indicators of ill effects of combat operational stress is post-traumatic stress disorder 
(NIMH, 2008). Post-traumatic stress disorder is a mental health disorder which has been 
closely associated with negative effects of combat operational stress (Hoge et al., 2004). 
Consecutive annual increases in PTSD could also indicate negative effects of combat 
operational stress and ineffective prevention training and education services. According 
to the Defense Medical Epidemiology Database (DMED), the number of new PTSD 
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diagnosis cases for active duty Marines has been growing each year of Operations Iraqi 
and Enduring Freedom. Since 2003, the number of new Marine Corps PTSD cases grew 
by 1,995, a very significant 836 percent increase (DMSS, 2009). This unprecedented 
growth in PTSD has clearly made the case for stronger and more vigorous efforts for 
prevention and restoration of operational stress casualties. The combat operational stress 
prevention efforts necessitate evaluating the effectiveness of the existing combat 
operational stress training and education program to determine if such a program meets 
the training efficacy criteria of the Marine Corps, while providing Marines with the 
necessary resources to effectively manage combat operational stress. 
The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most sustained U.S. combat 
operations since the Vietnam war. These ongoing wars will produce a new generation of 
veterans at risk for mental health problems associated with sustained combat operations. 
Combat stress reactions have been identified throughout the history of war (Shay, 1994). 
However, the terms associated with combat operational stress, the attributions for its 
causes, the prevalence and manifestations, and how it can be prevented and managed will 
continue to evolve (Shay, 1994). 
Concerning current American combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), approximately 20 percent of 
OIF and OEF veterans eligible to receive Veterans Administration (VA) benefits had 
received some health care at a VA facility, with possible mental health disorders being 
reported in 26 percent of these veterans seeking treatment (Kang & Hyams, 2004). The 
most diagnoses have been adjustment disorders, including about 10 percent with a 
possible diagnosis of PTSD (Kang & Hyams, 2004). In another study, about 17 percent 
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of soldiers and Marines returning from OIF screened positive for PTSD, depression, and 
other anxiety disorders (Hoge et al., 2004). This prevalence was approximately twice the 
pre-deployment reported rate. More recently it was found that approximately one third of 
OIF veterans accessed mental health services their first year after deployment, with 12 
percent receiving a mental health diagnosis (Hoge et al., 2006). These findings confirm 
the results from the earlier studies. For example, two different studies indicated that 
lifetime prevalence of PTSD estimates have ranged from 7.8 percent to 12.3 percent in 
research with civilian populations (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; 
Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, & Best, 1993). On the other hand, studies of 
military members who served in the Vietnam War, have shown much higher lifetime 
PTSD prevalence estimates of 30.9 percent for men and 26.0 percent for women (Weiss 
et al., 1992). These findings clearly show that military members who previously deployed 
to combat zones have a much higher chance of acquiring PTSD. These facts alone 
necessitate the need for strong preventive combat operational stress training and 
education services as early prevention is much less costly than health care treatments 
later on. 
After people experience a particularly stressful event, they often feel they should 
be able to move on and "just handle it" or "get over it." Some experiences, however, are 
so traumatic that people have a difficult time coping and functioning in their daily lives 
(Stevens, 2006). The stress that results from traumatic events precipitates a spectrum of 
psycho-emotional and physiopathological outcomes. In its gravest form, this response is 
diagnosed as a psychiatric disorder consequential to the experience of traumatic events 
(Iribarren, Prolo, Neagos, & Chiappelli, 2005). People with PTSD often relive their 
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experiences through nightmares and flashbacks. They report difficulty in sleeping. Their 
behavior becomes increasingly detached or estranged and is frequently aggravated by 
related disorders such as depression, substance abuse, and problems of memory and 
cognition. The disorder soon leads to impairment of the ability to function in social or 
family life, which more often than not results in occupational instability, marital 
problems, family discord, and general difficulties in parenting (Iribarren et al., 2005). 
Moreover, the disorder can be severe enough and last long enough to impair the person's 
daily life and, in the extreme, and may even lead to suicidal tendencies (Iribarren et al., 
2005). 
A number of studies have found associations between combat exposure and PTSD 
rates or symptoms. Studies conducted with Vietnam veterans, for example, found 
substantial relationships between combat exposure and PTSD (Dohrenwend et al., 2007; 
Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999; Koenen, Stellman, & Sommer, 2003). Similar results have 
been observed for veterans of the Gulf War (Adler, Vaitkus, & Martin, 1996; Southwick, 
Morgan, Darnell, Bremner, Nicolaou, Nagy, & Charney, 1995; Wolfe, Brown, & Kelley, 
1993). There is less evidence for this association for the current conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, although evidence is beginning to emerge, for the U.S. (Hoge, et al., 2004; 
Smith, et al., 2008) and British military service members (Iversen, Fear, & Ehlers, 2008). 
This fact alone necessitates a need for a thorough review of combat operational stress 
preventive services as such could play a role in decreasing PTSD rates in combat 
veterans. 
Veterans with PTSD also often have more severe marital and family problems 
than veterans without PTSD (Jordan, 1992). Post-traumatic stress disorder manifests 
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itself by significant emotional numbing and interpersonal withdrawal (Nash, 2007). 
These symptoms impair veteran's family relationships causing further stress and 
deepening of PTSD's vicious cycle of self destruction (Jordan, 1992). The social costs of 
PTSD are tremendous with many disrupted veteran families, including neglected and 
abused wives and children. Properly instituted and effectively managed preventive 
combat operational stress training and education services could result in decreasing the 
number of combat stress casualties, thus easing the pain of the follow-on social costs 
associated with PTSD and other combat operational stress induced mental health 
disorders. 
Although combat exposure is typically thought of as the paramount stressor of 
war, a number of investigators have emphasized the importance of other general military 
deployment stress factors, which have often been labeled as operational stress (Bartone, 
Vaitkus, & Adler, 1998; King, King, Gudanowski, & Vreven, 1995; Litz, King, King, 
Orsillo, & Friedman, 1997). Operational stressors have been labeled in various ways, 
including deployment-related stressors, low-magnitude stressors, general overseas 
stressors, malevolent environment, and contextual stressors (Engelhard & van den Hout, 
2007; King, King, Gudanowski, & Vreven, 1995; Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich, & 
Batres, 1997). Examples of these deployment-related operational stressors include 
excessive heat and cold, concerns or problems with family members back home, 
boredom, lack of sleep, lack of privacy, problems with supervisors, and inadequate 
availability of supplies or equipment. 
The National Center for PTSD estimated the lifetime prevalence of PTSD in 
American general population was about 10 percent; however, about 30 percent of the 
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veterans who were deployed to recent combat zones might experience PTSD (Iribarren et 
al., 2005). In other words, about 1/3 of war veterans might be suffering from PTSD. For 
instance, currently about 180,000 American combat troops are deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Global Security, 2009). Based on the above logic, potentially over 60,000 
of them could acquire PTSD as a direct consequence of participating in combat 
operations overseas. This is a striking statistic which must be taken seriously and 
definitely underscores the need for an effective combat operational stress preventive 
training and education program and an evaluation of the existing one. 
Risk Factors in Combat Operational Stress 
Studies have found exposure to severe combat stressors relate to the subsequent 
development of a range of physiological disorders (Boscarino, 1997). Other studies have 
documented the association between exposure to deployment related stressors and the 
development of psychiatric disorders (Hoge et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 1991; King et al., 
1999). Deployment is also associated with increased symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Hoge et al., 2004), depression (Hoge et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 1991), and anger 
problems (Adler, Dolan, & Castro, 2000; McCarroll, Ursano, Liu, Thayer, Newby, 
Norwood, & Fullerton, 2000). Furthermore, while symptom reports may be low during 
the immediate post-deployment period, studies with soldiers have found that these 
symptoms increase three to six months later (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; 
Bliese, Wright, Adler, & Thomas, 2006). In all, it is estimated that between 20-30 percent 
of the U.S. military personnel returning from combat operations report significant 
psychological symptoms (Cox, 1995). For these reasons alone, U.S. military services 
need to institute broad combat operational stress preventive training and education 
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services to teach service members how to effectively deal with negative aspects of 
combat operational stress. 
Research conducted after military conflicts has shown that length of deployment, 
multiple deployments, and exposure to combat are positively associated with combat 
operational stress reactions (Dohrenwend et al., 2007; Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999; 
Koenen, Stellman, Stellman, & Sommer, 2003; Hoge et al., 2004; Jordan et al , 1991; 
King et al., 1999). These might include increased risk of acquiring PTSD, depression, 
anxiety disorders, substance abuse, impaired functioning in social and employment 
settings, and increased utilization of health care services (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & 
Milliken, 2006; Toomey, Kang, Karlinsky, Baker, Vasterling, Alpern, Reda, Henderson, 
Murphy, & Eisen, 2007). The current American led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq confirm 
that characteristics of military participation in these wars, which includes combat 
exposure, are associated with mental disorders since the proportion of service members 
reported to have PTSD was 3.7 times higher among those who served in ground units of 
the Army or Marines (11 percent) as compared to deployed members of the Navy or Air 
Force (3 percent) (U.S. Army Surgeon General, 2006). Additionally, deployed military 
reservists are susceptible to combat stress as much and often more than their active duty 
counterparts (Perconte, Wilson, Pontius, Dietrick, & Spiro, 1993). This fact further 
necessitates the need for more effective training and education preventive services to 
counter these very negative, damaging, and potentially costly trends. 
The high operational tempo within the U.S. Marine Corps required to meet the 
demands of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in extended and multiple 
deployments for many Marines. There are reasonable concerns about a possible dramatic 
increase in the prevalence of combat stress reactions over the next several years given 
that multiple and extended deployments are positively associated with mental health 
problems (Toomey et al., 2007). The rates of utilization of mental health services for the 
Army and Marine Corps have already increased over time since 2000, suggesting the 
current military operations are causing an increase in mental health problems and are 
burdening the health care system (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; Kang & 
Hyams, 2004). The prevention training and education services, and then the identification 
and early treatment of mental health problems are essential in reducing chronic mental 
health impairment rates and thus overburdening the military and civilian health care 
systems. 
The war in Iraq is the largest sustained ground combat operation undertaken by 
the U.S. military since the Vietnam War. Shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, a 
study done by Horowitz and Solomon (1975) predicted that in subsequent years mental 
health professionals would see the development of PTSD among many Vietnam-era 
combatants. Extensive research conducted with Vietnam veterans over the past 20 years 
has largely validated these earlier concerns (Kaylor, King, & King, 1987; King, King, 
Foy, Keane, & Fairbank, 1999). A recent report by Hoge et al. (2004) offered some 
preliminary evidence that present-day combat duty in Iraq carries a similar risk for long-
term mental health problems. 
A number of recent publications have highlighted the potential psychiatric impact 
of combat exposure on military members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan (Friedman, 
2004; Jones, 2004; Lamberg, 2004). In another study Hoge et al. (2004) screened four 
combat units for emotional disorders before deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan (n = 
2,530), and four other units, three to four months after their return (n = 3,671). The 
percentage of participants whose responses met the screening criteria for major 
depression, generalized anxiety disorder, or PTSD was significantly higher for the groups 
returning from Iraq or Afghanistan compared to the groups assessed before deployment. 
This was particularly true for PTSD and deployments to Iraq. The percentage of 
respondents who met the strict screening criteria for PTSD after combat duty in Iraq was 
more than double the rate found in the pre-deployment group (12.2 percent to 12.9 
percent against 5.0 percent). This is indicative that preventive training and education 
services are especially needed for military members prior to deployment, with the notion 
that such prevention training would make them more resilient to ill effects of combat 
operational stress. 
The Hoge et al. (2004) study also found that only a minority (20-40 percent) of 
service members who met the screening criteria for a mental disorder reported having 
sought professional assistance. This finding is probably at least partially attributable to 
stigma associated with seeking help and service members' concerns for how their help-
seeking will be perceived by peers and leadership. Ideally, methods of early intervention 
would be identified for use with service members exposed to combat that could 
effectively reduce the risk of developing PTSD, thereby lessening the need for help-
seeking in the long term. Training and education aimed both at leadership and rank and 
file could also be used to lessen the ill effects of inherent stigma, thus allowing more 
Marines to get the mental health care when they really need it. 
Intimate Partner Violence 
Another serious problem associated with combat operational stress and military 
veterans is intimate partner violence. Intimate partner violence is also a serious national 
public health problem. Approximately 12 percent of couples in the United States report 
male-to-female violence each year (Straus & Gelles, 1990), and recent national surveys 
indicate that 1.3 million women are physically assaulted by an intimate male partner 
annually, with nearly half of these victims reporting injury (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2003; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). Intimate partner violence is related to 
an increased frequency of physician and emergency room visits (Bergman & Brismar, 
1991; McLeer & Anwar, 1989; Plichta, 1992), as well as a wide variety of negative 
health consequences, including death (Campbell, 2002; Campbell et al., 2002; Coker et 
al., 2002; Coker, Smith, Bethea, King, & McKeown, 2000; Eisenstat & Bancroft, 1999; 
Greenfeld et al., 1998; Sutherland, Sullivan, & Bybee, 2001). Furthermore, the yearly 
cost of direct medical and mental health care to victims of intimate partner violence has 
been estimated at $4.1 billion (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009), 
irrespective of indirect costs such as loss of work and decreased productivity. 
Interest in the difficulties faced by military families has increased in recent years 
due in part to the well-publicized 2002 domestic homicides at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, among Special Forces units who served in Afghanistan. There are about 26.4 
million veterans residing in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2009), and 
the total United States military force is currently comprised of over 1.4 million active 
duty personnel, of which 52 percent are married and 85 percent are male (Global 
Security, 2009). The reported rates of intimate partner violence among military veterans 
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and active duty servicemen range from 13.5 percent to 58 percent respectively, which 
translate somewhere between 189,000 to 812,000 of intimate partner violence cases 
among the active duty population (Marshall, Panuzio, & Casey, 2005). Intimate partner 
violence is then a significant problem, with combat stress most likely contributing and 
exacerbating the problem (Marshall, Panuzio, & Casey, 2005). Preventive combat 
operational stress services to include training and education are then needed to help the 
service members refrain from such a negative outcome as intimate partner violence. 
Barriers to Mental Health Care 
The prevention services, and the identification and early treatment of mental 
health problems, might be difficult to achieve within the military culture due to the 
existing barriers to care, either real or perceived, which prevents seeking help. A number 
of barriers to formal help-seeking for mental health problems in the U.S. military have 
been identified or suggested. Some of these include: lack of awareness of resources for 
help, ignorance of combat stress symptoms, fear of harming one's career, perceived lack 
of access to or effectiveness of treatment, fear of being placed on medications, and belief 
that problems will improve on their own (Hoge et al., 2004; Litz et al., 2002). Properly 
instituted and conducted combat operational stress preventive training and education 
services could alleviate some of the ignorance and fear of the unknown still undoubtedly 
present amongst the rank and file of the U.S. military. 
The Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs have collaborated to screen for 
mental health problems early in the post-deployment phase. This is done by examining all 
returning soldiers and Marines by administering the Post-Deployment Health Assessment 
survey. However, this one-time administered snapshot of mental health evaluation may 
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prove insensitive to the complexities inherent in adaptation of war trauma. Evidence from 
longitudinal studies of trauma survivors suggests that early distress and associated 
symptoms are not highly predictive of long-term adaptation (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 
2002). This implies that there are some who may not be identified as needing help soon 
after deployment, but subsequently develop symptoms attributable to combat stress. 
Preventive combat operational stress training and education and early identification and 
treatment are particularly important because there is evidence that once chronic post-
traumatic adaptation difficulties develop, they tend to persist across the lifespan 
(Prigerson, Maciejewski, & Rosenheck, 2001; Schnurr, Friedman, Foy, Shea, Hsieh, 
Lavori, et al., 2003). 
The early identification and treatment of mental health problems is a particular 
challenge within the military for several reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume the 
prevalence of mental health problems may be under-diagnosed and under-reported 
because patients often seek their primary care for reasons other than mental health 
(Regier, Narrow, Rae, Manderscheid, Locke, & Godwin, 1993). Other factors which may 
cause mental health cases to go either undetected or unreported include symptoms not 
being recognized as being combat stress-related (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; 
Kang & Hyams, 2004). The reasons behind this situation lie in lack of education and 
allowing the mental health stigma to persist in military units (Hoge et al., 2004). One of 
the primary goals of preventive combat operational stress education is to train Marines 
and Marine leaders to eradicate the combat stress related stigma and encourage all 
Marines to seek help from mental health providers when such help is needed. For these 
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specific reasons, there is a need for effective combat operational stress training and 
education program services and an evaluation of the existing ones. 
Mental disorders are the second leading illness category and often co-exist with 
other medical conditions in the U.S. military (Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, 
2009). However, stigma is a particular barrier to care when it comes to the treatment of 
mental health problems (Hoge et al., 2004). Hoge et al. (2004) found that only half of the 
recent war veterans who had a serious mental disorder were even interested in receiving 
help and only 26 percent received formal mental health care. It is also plausible that 
mental health specialty clinics contribute to the stigma just by being special clinics, 
having special entrances, and having special mental health medical records. This problem 
may be compounded by a military environment in which Marines live and work together 
and therefore often lack the privacy of using a mental health clinic on base or post (Hoge, 
Terhakopian, Castro, Messer, & Engel, 2007). Active duty members can also seek mental 
health help from providers located off military bases and posts. However, many members 
do not realize this benefit is available to them (Hoge et al., 2007). Formally instituted 
preventive combat operational stress training and education could help in alleviating this 
problem too, resulting in more service members seeking help for mental health disorders. 
The Department of Defense has taken several measures to overcome barriers to 
mental health care. One of the measures is including provisions of mental health services 
in primary care clinics as opposed to specialty care services specifically for mental 
health. Providing mental health services in primary care settings offers several 
advantages. First, it increases awareness and treatment of mental health issues (Hoge et 
al., 2004; Engel & Aquilino, 2004). Second, it establishes standardized mental health 
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services as routine, which should result in increased screening (Engel & Aquilino, 2004). 
Third, it improves accessibility through walk-in treatments, increases patient trust, and 
reduces stigma associated with mental health care (Hoge et al., 2004; Engel & Aquilino, 
2004). The Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education 
could play a significant role in spreading these messages too, contributing to more service 
members seeking help without fears of being stigmatized by their own peers and leaders. 
Given the expected influx of recent war veterans with possible mental disorders 
and the difficulties with identification and treatment, there is a pressing need to plan for 
increased mental health care (Kang & Hyams, 2004). In spite of indicators that veterans 
of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be at a significant risk for mental health problems 
(Litz, 2006), there is much that is unknown about the prevalence of these barriers to care, 
how these factors affect help-seeking behavior, the level of satisfaction with any care that 
is received, and the level of satisfaction with the received combat operational stress 
preventive training. The main purpose of this study was to assess the current level of the 
Marine Corps preventive combat operational stress training and education efforts. The 
data obtained from this study could also serve as a baseline to track the effects of the 
Marine Corps educational training and treatment efforts related to combat operational 
stress control, thus directly benefiting future evaluations. 
Dealing with Death and Injury Grief 
As of January 2010, more than 6,285 coalition troops have been killed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (iCasualites.org, 2010). An estimated 80 percent of soldiers and Marines 
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan knew someone seriously injured or killed during their 
deployment (Hoge et al., 2004). There is widespread recognition of the strong attachment 
bonds that develop between service members during war (Davidovitz, Mikulincer, 
Shaver, Izsak, & Popper, 2007). Because of these extremely strong attachment bonds, 
grief associated with the death of a friend in combat could be enormously traumatic 
(Pivar & Field, 2004). Service members need to know how to deal with combat related 
death and injury grief. Timely and effective preventive combat operational stress 
education could teach individual soldiers and Marines how to deal with combat related 
trauma. This fact further validates the need for evaluation of the current state of the 
Marine Corps preventive combat operational stress training and education services to 
determine their effectiveness for dealing with traumatically stressful events. 
It is extremely important to know how to deal with combat related trauma (Papa, 
Neria, & Litz, 2008). The concepts of "complicated grief, "traumatic grief, or 
"prolonged grief, has in recent years been advanced to highlight reactions to grief that 
are pathological and beyond what is considered normal bereavement reactions (Horowitz, 
Siegel, Holen, Bonanno, Milbrath, & Stonson, 1997). These reactions are particularly 
unremitting and chronic and become impairing as the individual is unable to work 
through the grief, integrate the loss, and continue on with his or her life. Individuals may 
experience intense emotional pain and sorrow, constantly long for the deceased person, 
and have intrusive thoughts about the deceased (Boelen & Prigerson, 2007). Complicated 
grief reactions are more likely in the event of a sudden, traumatic loss, consequently, 
combat loss is particularly insidious (Ott, Lueger, Kelber, & Prigerson, 2007). Education 
and training on how to deal with combat loss has proven helpful with some individuals 
showing signs of returning to normal lives following traumatic losses of close friends or 
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family members (Boelen, de Keijser, Van den Hout, & Van den Bout, 2007; Shear, 
Frank, Houck, & Reynolds, 2005). 
Guilt and Shame in Combat Veterans 
Feeling of guilt and shame is one aspect of combat stress worth special 
mentioning. Combat veterans often experience guilt and shame related to various acts of 
omission (Kubany, 1994; Wong & Cook, 1992), and this has been argued to be an 
essential feature of combat PTSD (Shay, 1994). These experiences arguably cause "moral 
injury" (Shay, 1994). Guilt and shame related to moral injury are one of the most 
damaging psychological legacies of war (Nash, Silva, & Litz, 2009). Severity of guilt 
symptoms correlates positively with overall PTSD severity, particularly re-experiencing 
and avoidance symptoms (Henning & Freuh, 1997), and factor analytic studies show that 
guilt emerges as a factor in PTSD symptoms in combat veterans (Watson, Kucala, Juba, 
Manifold, Anderson, & Anderson, 1991). Some of these negative outcomes could be 
alleviated by preventive education and training services. Military members who 
understand how to deal with trauma could have a better chance of not experiencing the 
feelings of guilt and shame following traumatic losses of close military friends, thus 
decreasing chances of acquiring PTSD (Nash, Silva, & Litz, 2009). 
Improvised Explosive Devices 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have had menacing effects upon our troops 
morale and psychological health. One of the most common, potentially traumatizing 
events for service members in Iraq and Afghanistan are IED attacks on convoys (Global 
Security.org, 2009). Enemy forces hide mortar rounds, artillery projectiles, and other 
explosive-filled ordnance alongside roads and highways and then remotely detonate them 
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to cause maximum blast injuries to passing vehicles and their occupants. IEDs are 
cleverly disguised by burying them under roads, in piles of garbage, in abandoned 
vehicles, and dead animal carcasses. Often a series of munitions are wired together in a 
"daisy chain," so that a single signal will detonate all of them at the same time. Attacks 
on convoys by suicide bombers driving explosive-filled vehicles ("vehicle-borne 
explosive devices," or "VBEDs") are also common (Global Security.org, 2009). When 
protective armor on the vehicle does not adequately guard the occupants, physical 
injuries from the blast tend to be the most severe in areas not covered by body armor, i.e., 
face, neck, arms, lower abdomen/back, and legs (Gawande, 2004). In the immediate 
aftermath of an IED attack, survivors are at risk for further attacks by enemy forces in the 
form of small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades. Any injured or dead are cared for 
by their fellow service members until medical responders arrive on the scene (Gawande, 
2004). 
Service members who spend a significant amount of time on the road in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, whether providing security to supply convoys or patrolling in search of 
enemy forces, may experience multiple separate IED attacks on their convoys during 
their deployment time. The risk is omnipresent when outside the secured perimeter of 
American military bases (Gawande, 2004). Unless service members are seriously injured 
in an IED attack, they are returned to normal duties quickly, oftentimes within a day or 
two (Cigrang et al., 2005). One can imagine how stressful such experiences can be. This 
is another reason behind preventive education and training services to teach soldiers and 
Marines how to effectively deal with such traumatic events ubiquitous in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
Injured Service Members 
Injured soldiers and those with higher levels of combat exposure have generally 
had higher rates of PTSD following previous wars (Kang, Natelson, Mahan, Lee, & 
Murphy, 2003; Kulka, Schlenger, Fairban, Hough, Jordan, Marmar, & Weiss, 1990; Ikin, 
Sim, Creamer, Forbes, McKenzie, Kelsall, Glass, McFarlane, Abramson, Ittak, Dwyer, 
Blizzard, Delaney, Horsley, Harrex, & Schwarz, 2004). However, rarely have these 
soldiers been studied shortly following injury (Ikin et al., 2004; Koren, Norman, Cohen, 
Berman, & Klein, 2005). A small study of Israeli soldiers found that 16.7 percent of 
injured soldiers had PTSD approximately 15 months following injury, compared to 2.5 
percent of non-injured soldiers with similar combat experiences (Koren et al., 2005). It is 
important to work with the injured members to prevent them from lapsing into PTSD 
symptoms with preventive training and education being important pieces of that work. 
Training Effectiveness 
One of the keys to keeping troops free of mental health problems is emphasis on 
proactive and preemptive training and education (Hoyt, 2006). The Marine Corps has 
been embedding mental health professionals such as chaplains, psychologists, and 
psychiatrists in combat units themselves. Having such professionals in-place enables the 
commanding officers to conduct preventive training and education actions continuously 
as preparatory and resilience-enhancing efforts (Hoyt, 2006). Such approaches result in 
the integrated delivery of psychological care to Marine infantry units throughout their 
deployment cycle. These include providing training, assessment, and support before and 
after a deployment while in garrison, and of course ongoing into their deployment within 
the theater of operations. One particular advantage of this longitudinal involvement is an 
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understanding of recent events, experienced systemically or individually, that might 
influence current psychological reactions or dispositions, and additionally, future actions 
or vulnerabilities to future events (Litz et al., 2002). 
There are numerous advantages to utilizing an embedded model of care with these 
operational Marine units. The advantages include (1) significantly enhanced 
understanding of contextualization issues necessary for accurate assessment, intervention, 
and mission enhancement; (2) increased prevention, early intervention, and systemic 
implementation emphasis; and (3) greater accuracy of dispositional recommendations, 
with resultant increases in their utilization due to perceived credible and knowledgeable 
performance. These advantages enable the embedded mental health professionals to 
effectively influence the prevention efforts which include training and education (Hoyt, 
2006). The one particular advantage of this long-term involvement is an understanding of 
recent events, experienced systemically or individually, that might influence current 
psychological reactions or dispositions, and additionally, future actions or vulnerabilities 
to future events (Hoyt, 2006). Having mental health professionals in the units available 
for prevention work is definitely positive and most likely results in preventing some of 
the mental health problems within the unit itself (Everly & Lating, 2004; Litz, et al., 
2002; Sammons, 2005). 
Recent literature indicates that embedding mental health professionals in combat 
units results in enhanced addressing of combat stress reactions and disorders such as 
PTSD as part of preparatory and resilience-inducing efforts (Everly & Lating, 2004; Litz, 
et al., 2002; Sammons, 2005; Ursano, Grieger, & McCarroll, 1996). The chief advantage 
of having mental health professionals working inside of the operating unit are expanded 
opportunities for training and equipping leadership with mental health resiliency 
prevention tools (Hoyt, 2006). The chief emphasis is to work with young leadership 
consisting of the non-commissioned officers (NCOs), staff non-commissioned officers 
(SNCOs), and junior officers. These small unit leadership groups are critical to the 
mental health strength-enhancing resiliency actions (Hoyt, 2006). 
Another advantage of such preventive training efforts is multiplication of the 
effectiveness by mitigating stressors and difficulties among troops before they become 
more entrenched. Ursano et al. (1996) characterized these efforts as assisting in the 
"metabolism" of early stress symptoms and diminishing future problematic psychological 
functioning and behavior. Ursano et al. (1996) also indicated such preventive stress 
interventions should include educational components, preventive and early-intervention 
efforts, and appropriate referral resources as appropriate. Educational and intervention 
components include: (1) identification, prevention, and mitigation of acute or cumulative 
combat and operational stressors, (2) the continuum of normative to non-normative 
responses to these stressors, (3) awareness of the effects of acute or cumulative stressors 
such as longstanding sleep deprivation or sustained hyper-arousal, (4) the powerful 
moderating effects of leadership and unit cohesion as buffering forces for troops, (5) the 
means to minimize the "fog and friction" of war for subordinates, (6) addressing the 
fears, losses, and uncertainties of combat deployments, and finally, (7) emphasizing the 
confidence enhancement resulting from sustained and realistic training experiences 
(Ursano et al., 1996). Overarching goals of these normalizing and education processes 
include the development of structure or meaning in difficult experiences, greater mastery 
over symptoms and triggers, and a proper focus on coping mechanisms (Ursano et al., 
1996). 
Central to a preemptive training approach is the importance of collaborating with 
existing supportive personnel (small-unit leadership, medical officers, or chaplains) and 
training structures integral to the military training pipeline. Shephard (2000) astutely 
noted, "Military psychiatry is often done best, not by psychiatrists, but by doctors, 
officers, and soldiers who understand the principles of group psychology and use the 
defenses in the culture to help people through traumatic situations" (p. 398). Through 
such preventive training interventions, integrated leaders at varying levels can provide 
interventions for troops within their own spheres of influence and often do provide 
normalizing and preventive psychological first-aid interventions to those who would not 
traditionally come to the attention of mental health until the magnitude of their 
difficulties increased (Shephard, 2002). 
Another benefit of combat operational stress preventive training efforts is 
reduction in stigma attached to mental health services among operational units (Hoge et 
al, 2004). Corrigan, Markowitz, and Watson (2004) discussed the concept of institutional 
stigma and restricted access to mental health care, a particularly significant issue within 
the traditions of infantry unit functioning, Special Forces, and various other unique or 
elite military groups. There can exist a strong ethos against acknowledgment of 
individual or group vulnerability, with these admissions potentially influencing external 
appraisals of individuals' operational functioning (Corrigan, Markowitz, & Watson, 
2004). Accordingly, there exists a subtle distrust of outsider influence that may disrupt 
group intactness or operational performance and lead to underutilization of mental health 
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resources. For this reason, extremely effective preventive mental health training efforts 
are those which originate from within the infantry unit, utilize existing infantry structure 
and leadership, and are performed by integrated providers who are contextually 
knowledgeable. Systemic intervention refers to the importance of leveraging one's 
impact on a group, thereby affecting a greater number of individuals in the process. A 
key principle of systemic interaction is facilitating a military group's ability to care for its 
own needs. One of the primary vehicles to multiply one's effectiveness in this manner is 
to assist leadership in training subordinates (Hoyt, 2006). 
One central task of leadership in the military is the development of individual and 
organizational resilience in response to mission threats. Intimately linked to the concept 
of individual resilience, of turning hurdles or adversity into opportunity and even 
enhancement, is the construct of personality hardiness. A significant body of research has 
focused on mental constructs of commitment, control, and challenge as indicators of 
hardiness and psychological stability amid highly stressful conditions (Bartone, 1999; 
Bartone, Ursano, Saczynski, & Ingraham, 1989; Kobasa, 1979; Maddi, 1999). Maddi and 
Khoshaba (2003) suggested that during adverse or stressful events, those high in 
commitment tend to experience vitality through involvement in the situation around them 
and their sense of being a part of something bigger than themselves. Those strong in 
control tend to inject themselves into difficult situations, perceiving their effort to be 
worthwhile as means of influencing the outcome. Finally, those strongly oriented to the 
challenge construct receive significant fulfillment in learning from their experiences, that 
is, benefiting from both good and bad experiences without quickly dismissing negative 
experiences as unprofitable (Bartone, 1999). This hardiness construct has been shown to 
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be a significant stress-resilient moderator among Gulf War veterans, with high-hardy 
individuals experiencing significantly fewer combat stress symptoms than low-hardy 
individuals under high-stress conditions (Bartone, 1999). 
The mental constructs of commitment, control, and challenge ultimately involve 
the meaning or interpretations that individuals attach to the events they experience, with 
these appraisals then impacting future personal actions. This evaluative meaning-making 
process of one's experiences is highly amenable to leadership influences (Bartone, 1999), 
particularly notable in groups with direct and frequent contact and under high-stress 
conditions. In these contexts, Bartone (1999) suggests leaders who are high in hardiness 
have a unique and powerful format to communicate their appraisals of events and thereby 
shape how group challenges are constructed or interpreted by subordinates. He further 
highlights the powerful mediums of group orientation in military training, the 
interdependent nature of small-unit work, and the authoritative counsel, experiences, and 
example leaders set as powerful media on how individual experiences get interpreted 
(Bartone, 1999). Using these constructs as a basis for leadership training, embedded 
mental health professionals can have a significant institutional impact on the shaping and 
preparation of the combatants they serve (Hoyt, 2006). 
Although service members certainly experience the necessary aspects of tough, 
realistic, and approximated training physically, leaders may not be appreciably modeling 
or integrating the mental principles of resilience. Additionally, leadership consultation 
can include emphases on modeling of hardy approaches to problem solving and sense 
making of experiences; the psychological need for control, predictability, and situational 
coherence amid the "fog of war" challenges; mission clarity and conviction against loss 
and uncertainty; and providing the necessary confidences gained through state-dependent 
learning and contingency-laden training fostering mastery (Ursano et al., 1996). Properly 
instituted training and education services could teach leaders the principles of mental 
resilience in addition to physical ones, further necessitating the need for quality and 
holistic combat operational stress preventive training and education services. 
Department of Defense and Combat Stress 
Combat stress includes all the physiological and emotional stresses encountered 
as a direct result of dangers and mission demands of combat. However, the Department 
of Defense and the military services define combat stress differently. The Department of 
Defense and the U.S. Army identify Combat Operational Stress Control as programs 
developed and actions taken by military leadership to prevent, identify, and manage 
adverse effects of combat and operational stress in units; optimize mission performance; 
conserve fighting strength; prevent or minimize adverse effects of combat stress on 
service members' physical, psychological, intellectual and social health; and return the 
unit or service member to duty expeditiously (Department of Defense, 1999; Department 
of the Army, 2006). On the other hand, the U.S. Marine Corps defines Combat 
Operational Stress Control as specific actions encompassing all policies and programs to 
prevent, identify, and holistically treat mental injuries caused by combat or other 
operations (USMC, 2008). Specifically, the Marine Corps wants to treat mental health 
injuries caused by stress by a holistic approach encompassing mind, body, and Marines' 
families (Nash, 2007). This approach is reflected by the Marine Corps initiating 
development of a very robust preventive measures training and education program 
(Gaskin, 2008). However, since the program has only been recently started due to 
combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs to have a thorough evaluation to 
establish whether it is effective and meets the training efficacy criteria of the U.S. Marine 
Corps. 
Combat Operational Stress Control Preventive Training 
Training is a vital part of the Marine Corps preparation to go anywhere, take on 
any adversary, and win our Nation's wars (USMC, 1996). As such, Marine Corps units 
train as they expect to fight, which entails pragmatically using the learned skills in the 
field (USMC, 1996). This training philosophy provides the Marine Corps with the 
unifying goal for individual and collective training. This is a common thread woven 
throughout the Marine Corps, and with the American public requiring greater 
accountability of personnel utilization, public funds, effective and efficient training must 
focus on attaining and maintaining the state of operational readiness to support Marine 
air-ground task force (MAGTF) war fighting operations (USMC, 1996). 
The Marine Corps trains constantly to develop and maintain combat-ready 
Marines and units that can perform assigned tasks to specific standards. The Marine 
Corps training is standards-based, performance-oriented, and prioritized in accordance 
with mission requirements. The Marine Corps overarching training program aim is to 
build self-confidence, promote teamwork and esprit de corps, and develop 
professionalism in leaders (USMC, 1994). 
The Marine Corps uses the systems approach to training to maximize training 
results and focus the training principles of the unit in preparation for the conduct of the 
Marine Corps wartime missions. Depending on the unit and type of training, individual 
mission essential training may occur daily, weekly, monthly, or annually (USMC, 2004). 
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Combat operational stress preventive training is considered mission essential training 
(USMC, 2008). Marines are introduced to Combat Operational Stress Control basic 
knowledge and principles while undergoing the accession training at Boot Camp or the 
Basic Officer School. After graduating from the accession schooling and while at their 
units, Marines have opportunities to attend Combat Operational Stress Control formal 
training on an annual basis taught by qualified combat operational stress preventive 
training instructors (USMC, 2008). This formal training should consist of a series of 
lectures and small role play simulation exercises lasting about 6-8 hours depending on the 
audience and the instructor (USMC, 2008). Additionally, Marines are exposed to 
informal instruction conducted by their unit leaders almost daily. The emphasis of such 
informal pieces is on ensuring that Marines incorporate the learned combat operational 
stress preventive skills into their daily lives, thus maximizing the preventive goals of the 
training (USMC, 2008). 
Training as a unit builds teamwork, transmits skills and knowledge, and sustains 
proficiency in individual and collective tasks (USMC, 1996; USMC, 2004). Commanders 
should incorporate the best mix of individual and collective training to ensure that 
Marines learn and sustain proficiency in mission-essential skills. Marines learn best 
through performance-oriented training. This method requires them to perform tasks 
according to specified behaviors and standards, but not necessarily to occupy a specified 
time. The times shown on training schedules are only a guide; training is conducted until 
standards are met. The emphasis of training must be on the actual performance of the 
tasks. Combat operational stress preventive training is an integral part of mission 
essential unit and individual training and needs to be continuously conducted to preserve 
the Marine Corps most precious resource - individual Marines (USMC, 2009). 
Many Navy and Marine Corps officers view appropriate training and education as 
the key to prevention from negative effects of combat operational stress. In order to 
facilitate this approach, the Marine Corps has recently introduced a continuum model 
(Swan, 2008). Training and education based on this continuum model needs to be rank 
and grade focused and standardized across the Marine Corps to include all formal 
schools, pre-deployment training programs, and sustainment training. In order to 
facilitate the current world-wide operations, the Marine Corps recommends development 
of alternative training means, such as interactive internet resources, situational vignettes, 
videos, and other best practice methods to enhance and expand training quality, 
accessibility, and consistency (Gaskin, 2008). 
The Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education 
policy should be consistent with the current Marine Corps systems approach to training 
(USMC, 2004). The systems approach to training process ensures that training and 
education are conducted in an environment of awareness and continuous feedback 
(USMC, 2004). There are three specific combat operational stress preventive training 
phases: Phase I - Pre-deployment, Phase II - Redeployment, and Phase III - Post-
deployment. During each phase, Marine Corps leaders, enlisted Marines, and families 
have specific training roles to fulfill. The officers are to work with the enlisted Marines 
on reducing stigma associated with mental health issues, and thus create a unit climate 
that encourages seeking help from mental health professionals. Additionally, officers, 
enlisted Marines, and their families have opportunities to conduct phase specific training 
sessions. In order to facilitate this process, the Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress 
Control branch has developed and provided a series of training modules which aim to 
train and educate officers, enlisted Marines, and their families on topics concerning 
combat operational stress (Gaskin, 2008). 
Systems Approach to Training 
The Marine Corps uses the systems approach to training (USMC, 2004). The 
systems approach to training helps in managing the instructional process for analyzing, 
designing, developing, implementing, and evaluating instruction. The systems approach 
to training serves as a blueprint for organizing or structuring the instructional process. 
The systems approach to training is a set of comprehensive guidelines, tools, and 
techniques needed to close the gap between the current and the desired job performance 
through instructional interventions (USMC, 2004). The Marine Corps originally targeted 
the systems approach to training for use in its formal military occupational training 
schools, but the comprehensive system applies to unit and field training in addition to 
formal education, which makes it applicable to combat operational stress preventive 
training and education services (Gaskin, 2008). 
The systems approach to training is a dynamic, flexible system for developing and 
implementing effective and efficient instruction to meet the current and the projected 
needs. The systems approach to training process is flexible in that it accounts for 
individual differences in ability, rate of learning, motivation, and achievement to 
capitalize on the opportunity for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of instruction 
(USMC, 2004). The systems approach to training process reduces the number of school 
management decisions that have to be made subjectively and, instead, allows decisions to 
be made based on reasonable conclusions which are based on carefully collected and 
analyzed data. More than one solution to an instructional problem may be identified 
through the systems approach to training, however, the selection of the best solution is a 
goal of the systems approach to training (USMC, 2004). 
The Marine Corps system approach of training reflects the ADDIE (Analyze, 
Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate) instructional design model (Leshin, Pollock, 
& Reigeluth, 1992; Dick & Carey, 1996). The systems approach to training is a 
continuous, cyclical process allowing any one of these five phases, and their associated 
functions, to occur at any time (USMC, 2004). In addition, each phase within the systems 
approach to training further builds upon the previous phase, providing a system of checks 
and balances to insure all instructional data are accounted for and that revisions to 
instructional materials are identified and made. The combat operational stress preventive 
training has been built around the systems approach to training reflecting the ADDIE 
instructional design model (Gaskin, 2008; Leshin, Pollock, & Reigeluth, 1992; Dick & 
Carey, 1996). As a result, combat operational stress preventive training is flexible in 
terms of its design and implementation structure allowing for continuous improvement 
thus directly benefiting the Marines (Gaskin, 2008). 
Marine Corps Learning Comprehension Principles 
The preventive combat operational stress preventive training needs to follow the 
Marine Corps recommended steps for learning comprehension. The first step is that the 
combat operational stress preventive training needs to be relevant. In order for the 
training to be relevant, it needs to address the significance of the lesson to the Marine. 
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The Marine needs to understand how he or she will benefit from the training (USMC, 
2004). 
The second step is the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework 
provides two important things for Marine learners. First, it constitutes a roadmap of 
where the instructor will take the learner during the training. Second, it creates gaps in 
the learner's mind that must be filled (USMC, 2004). For example, if the instructor tells a 
learner that he is going to talk about three things and then names them, the instructor 
creates conceptual gaps in the learner's mind that can be powerful tools in the learning 
process. By filling these gaps, the instructor provides the student with closure and 
understanding. The combat operational stress preventive training is certainly no 
exception and needs to contain a conceptual framework consisting of a roadmap along 
with learning gaps which will need to be filled during the training process. 
The third step involves the learning outcomes. By stating the learning outcomes, 
the program's lesson plans identify specific learning tasks that Marines must be able to 
perform at the end of each training session. Specifically, the proposed learning outcomes 
identify what Marines will be able to do, under what conditions they will perform these 
tasks, and the required proficiency (USMC, 2004). Knowing the learning outcomes can 
definitely reduce the Marine's anxiety so he or she can concentrate on learning. Parlaying 
this paradigm, each session of the combat operational stress preventive training needs to 
have specific learning outcomes which need to be clearly understood by all participants. 
The fourth step contains the actual method of instruction. The method of 
instruction will identify how Marines will learn. Will it be a practical application, lecture, 
or a demonstration? Knowing the method ahead of time can reduce Marines' anxieties so 
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they can concentrate on learning. Combat operational stress preventive training consists 
of a mix of lectures, simulations, practical applications, and demonstrations. Marines 
should know ahead of time what will be the actual method of instruction so they can 
focus on actual learning tasks as appropriate (USMC, 2004). 
Evaluation is the fifth step in the process. The primary purpose of identifying how 
a Marine will be evaluated is to decrease anxiety. Leaders and instructors should identify 
the method of evaluation and when the evaluation will occur. Evaluation information is 
passed to Marines so they know what to expect for feedback. Additionally, evaluation 
information should directly relate to learning outcomes (USMC, 2004). 
The Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training is conducted 
using four instructional delivery methods: demonstrations, conferences which are also 
referred as guided discussions, lectures, and practical applications. These can be used 
alone or in combination (Rogers, 1986). A demonstration shows Marines the correct way 
to perform operations and tactics. It helps Marines see their individual role in a collective 
task. Demonstrations can be done several ways. Live demonstrations are often best 
because they hold a Marine's interest. Demonstrations must be performed unhurriedly. 
This allows Marines to see all the steps as they are performed. Demonstrations emphasize 
key points and create pauses for discussion. If the task contains many actions, the trainer 
performs the entire task first, then demonstrates each step of the task separately. 
Demonstrations that integrate practice times are similar to live demonstrations, 
but with an added practice session. They are sometimes referred to as talk-through, walk-
through demonstrations. After procedures are demonstrated and understood, Marines are 
given a chance to practice and simulate the steps under increasingly realistic conditions 
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until they can perform to desired standards. This type of training is especially valuable 
because it is engaging and experiential with a great probability of Marines actually 
acquiring new knowledge (Rogers, 1986). 
During conferences or guided discussions, Marines discuss the information 
presented. Trainers initiate and direct discussions by giving information and asking 
questions. Conferences work best when there is more than one correct procedure, when 
Marines have some knowledge of the tasks, or when time is not critical (USMC, 2004). 
Conferences are effective when the group is familiar with the subject. Even though the 
discussion is guided, experienced Marines will make many good training points, 
increasing interest among others (Rogers, 1986). The subjects are interesting and open to 
discussion. Conferences allow Marines to state options that trainers and other Marines 
can then discuss. To encourage participation, trainers must guide the discussions. 
Conferences do not require Marines to perform tasks. They encourage a free exchange of 
information. Trainers must know their subject well, and they must also have developed 
the ability to guide a discussion among Marines. The combat operational stress 
preventive training utilizes the conference training format during International Combat 
Operational Stress Control Conferences (Gaskin, 2008), resulting in a plethora of quality 
training opportunities. 
Lecturing presents information with little discussion. Typically, it is a one-way 
form of instruction - from the instructor to the instructed. As the least preferred method of 
instruction, lectures should be used only when there is a large group and no performance 
activities are required. Lectures are used in the Marine Corps when the training time is 
very limited and no other method allows the trainer to present information as quickly. 
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Also lecturing is appropriate when Marines know very little about the subject matter and 
lectures prepare them for demonstration and practice. Finally, lectures are used when 
trainers want to emphasize technical material with one correct or preferred method 
(Rogers, 1986). 
When using practical applications or simulations, the trainer seeks to provide as 
realistic training scenario as possible. Practical applications and simulations can be time-
consuming and involved, but they provide students with the best training environment for 
learning a task. The Marine Corps training, which focuses on performance-oriented 
training, requires the trainer to provide practical applications whenever feasible (USMC, 
2004). Factors that can affect the use of practical applications are availability of facilities 
and associated audio-visual equipment. Practical applications, more often than any other 
presentation method, need to be fully planned in advance. However, practical 
applications are worth the effort because they normally result in Marines actually 
learning the topic (Rogers, 1986). 
Kirkpatrick Model of Training Evaluation 
The Kirkpatrick (2006) model for training evaluation was selected as a framework 
to answer some of this study's research questions because it is one of the most 
recognizable available training evaluation models (Wang & Shuai, 2008). According to 
Kirkpatrick's (2006) methodology, there are four levels to training evaluation. The first 
one is concerned with the reaction of how training participants felt about the training. The 
second level considers learning. Assessing at this level moves the evaluation beyond the 
sheer learner satisfaction and attempts to assess the extent participants advanced in skill 
and actually gained knowledge. The third level measures knowledge transfer that has 
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occurred in participants' behavior due to partaking in the training program. Basically, 
evaluating at this level considers assessing whether the newly acquired skills are actually 
being used in the daily lives of the participants. The fourth level measures the success of 
the training program in terms of increasing or decreasing identifiable long-term 
indicators. These could include increases in sales and production of units or decreases in 
number of accidents or mental health disorder cases. 
There are three reasons training programs are evaluated. The first one concerns 
justifying the sheer existence and budget of the training department by showing how it 
contributes to the organization's objectives and goals. The second reason is to have a firm 
basis for determining whether to continue or discontinue a training program. The third 
reason is to gather the information on how to improve existing and future training 
programs (Kirkpatrick, 2006). This study is concerned with the evaluation of the 
preventive combat operational stress preventive training. Based on the information 
gathered in this study, the Combat Operational Stress Control branch officers will be able 
to improve their training program, and thus directly contribute to the preservation of 
Marines and sailors serving with the Marine Corps. 
Reaction Level 
Just as the word implies, evaluation at this level measures how participants in a 
training program react to it. It attempts to answer questions regarding the participants' 
perceptions: Did the learners like it? Was the material relevant to their work? According 
to Kirkpatrick (2006), every program should at least be evaluated at this level to provide 
for the improvement of a training program. In addition, the participants' reactions have 
important consequences for learning. Although a positive reaction does not guarantee 
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learning, a negative reaction almost certainly reduces its possibility (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Learners are often keenly aware of what they need to know to accomplish a task. If the 
training program fails to satisfy their needs, a determination should be made as to 
whether it is the fault of the program's design or instructional delivery. 
Evaluating and measuring reaction is important for several reasons. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, reaction provides feedback and views helping the decision 
makers to evaluate their training programs, which includes information needed to 
improve them. Second, reaction provides trainers with information which could be used 
by management and the trainers themselves to determine the training effectiveness skills 
baseline and self-improvement of the trainers. Third, reaction level information provides 
means for quantitative and qualitative analysis. This is especially important to the 
managers who can then use the statistical analysis information for decision making 
purposes. Finally, reaction level evaluation can provide quantitative information to the 
trainers themselves to establish their standards of performance for future programs 
(Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Reaction level evaluation is not indicative of the training's performance potential 
as it does not measure what new skills the learners have acquired or what they have 
learned which will transfer back to the working environment. This might cause some to 
downplay the real value of reaction level evaluation (Markus & Ruvulo, 1990). However, 
the interest, attention, and motivation of the participants are often critical to the success 
of any training process as people often learn better when they react positively to the 
learning environment by seeing the importance of the presented training. When learning 
material is first presented, learners normally make a decision as to whether they will pay 
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attention to it. When the training is thought of as important and achievable, then learners 
are normally motivated to engage in it (Markus & Ruvulo, 1990). However, when 
training is considered as non-relevant and there is a low probability of success, then a 
negative effect is generated and motivation for task engagement is low (Markus & 
Ruvulo, 1990). 
This differs somewhat from Kirkpatrick (2006) as he indicated, "If training is 
going to be effective, it is important that learners react favorably to it. Otherwise, they 
will not be motivated to learn" (p. 27). However, the less relevant the learning package is 
to learners, then the more effort that has to be put into the design and presentation of the 
learning package. In other words, if the training package is not relevant to the learner, 
then the learning material has to spark the learner's interest through a secondary means 
which might include, for example, an attractive media design. 
A well designed training package is important; however, use of it should be to 
promote or aid the learning process rather than the learning package itself. And if a 
learning package is built of sound purpose and design, then it should support the learners 
in bridging a performance gap (Kirkpatrick, 2006). This bridging action should be the 
actual motivation to learn. Nevertheless, reaction level evaluation should measure 
whether the training participants liked, disliked, or were neutral to the conducted training. 
It is because being positive about the training does normally result in learners actually 
learning the material. If they were negative about the training, then in most likelihood the 
learners were not motivated to learn the material. This study employed a self-assessment 
quantitative satisfaction survey and qualitative interviews/training session observations 
through which reaction level evaluation of training participants was determined as 
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recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). As a result, the researcher determined whether the 
Marine learners actually liked, disliked, or were neutral about the combat operational 
stress preventive training material. 
Learning Level 
Assessing at this level moves the evaluation beyond the learner satisfaction and 
attempts to assess the extent students have advanced in skills, knowledge, or attitude. 
Measurement at this level is more difficult and laborious than level one. Methods range 
from formal to informal testing to team assessment and self-assessment. If possible, 
participants need to take the test or assessment before the training (pre-test) and after 
training (post-test) to determine the amount of learning that has occurred. Another option 
is to employ self-assessment surveys and interviews with the training event learners and 
their supervisors. Such quantitative and qualitative data can then be used to determine 
whether in fact new knowledge has been gained (Kirkpatrick, 2006). This study 
employed self-assessment satisfaction surveys and qualitative interviews through which 
the learning level of combat operational stress preventive training participants was 
determined as recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). As a result, the researcher 
determined whether the Marine learners actually learned the subject matter training 
material. 
Measuring the learning that takes place in a training program is important in order 
to validate the learning objectives. Evaluating the learning typically focuses on such 
questions as: (1) What knowledge was acquired? (2) What skills were developed or at 
least enhanced? (3) What attitudes were changed? Learner assessments are created to 
allow a judgment to be made about the learner's capability for performance (Kirkpatrick, 
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2006). There are two parts to this process: gathering of information or evidence and 
interpreting the information. The gathering of information part might include testing the 
learner by administering a test or orally interviewing the learner. The judging of the 
information concerns determining what does the data represent? This assessment should 
not be confused with evaluation. Assessment is about the progress and achievements of 
individual learners, while evaluation is about the learning program as a whole (Tovey, 
1997). 
Knowledge Transfer Level 
This level measures the transfer that has occurred in learners' behavior due to the 
training program. Evaluating at this level attempts to answer the question: Are the newly 
acquired skills, knowledge, or attitude being used in the everyday environment of the 
learner (Kirkpatrick, 2006)? For many trainers this level represents the truest assessment 
of a training program's effectiveness. However, measuring at this level is difficult as it is 
often impossible to predict when the change in behavior will occur, and thus requires 
important decisions as when to evaluate, how often to evaluate, and how to evaluate 
(Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
This evaluation involves testing the learners capabilities to perform learned skills 
while on the job, rather than in the classroom. Do learners actually employ the learned 
skills in their daily lives? Knowledge transfer level evaluations can be performed 
formally by live testing or informally by means of observation (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Concerning the combat operational stress preventive training, Marine learners should 
have incorporated the gained skills required for coping with combat operational stress, 
thus providing themselves with preventive skills related to combat operational stress. 
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This has also been the training program's overarching learning goal and objective. This 
study also determined the program's state of knowledge transfer level by means of a self-
assessment survey and qualitative interviews through which the effectiveness of the 
knowledge transfer level of the training participants was assessed. 
In Kirkpatrick's (2006) original four-levels of evaluation, he names the level three 
as "behavior." However, behavior is the action that is performed, while the final result of 
the behavior is the performance. Gilbert (1998) said that performance has two aspects: 
behavior being the means and its consequence being the end. If this was only the 
behavioral aspect, then this behavioral characteristic could have been done in the training 
environment. However, the consequence of the behavior, the actual performance, is what 
the training is really after (Gilbert, 1998). The results are the learners now can fully 
perform and produce the needed results in the working environment. 
It is important to measure performance because the primary purpose of training is 
to improve results by having learners acquire new skills and knowledge and then actually 
apply them to the job. Learning new skills and knowledge is not beneficial to an 
organization unless the participants actually use new skills and knowledge in their work 
activities. Since knowledge transfer level measurements must take place after the learners 
have returned to their jobs, these measurements will typically involve someone closely 
involved with the learner, such as a supervisor or a subject matter expert familiar with the 
work settings (Kirkpatrick, 2006). Although it takes a greater effort to collect knowledge 
transfer level data than it does to collect data during training, its value is important to the 
organization as the data provides insight into the transfer of learning from the classroom 
to the actual work environment. The knowledge transfer level data also provides 
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information on the barriers encountered when attempting to implement the new 
techniques learned in the program, which then could be used to improve the program. 
Results Level 
Frequently thought of as the bottom line, this level measures the success of the 
program in terms which managers and executives can understand: increased production, 
improved quality, decreased costs, reduced frequency of accidents, increased sales, 
higher profits, higher return on investment, and in the case of the combat operational 
stress preventive training, decreased number of mental health cases. From a business and 
organizational perspective, results level evaluation should be the overall reason for a 
training program, yet results level evaluation is not typically addressed or even 
researched (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Results level evaluation measures the effectiveness of the training program. It 
determines what impact, if any, the training has achieved. Examples of impacts can 
include such items as money, efficiency, moral, teamwork, better utilization rates, 
decreased rates of absences from work, just to name a few. As one moves from level one 
to level four of the Kirkpatrick (2006) model, the evaluation process becomes more 
difficult and time-consuming. However, the higher levels provide information which is of 
increasingly significant value, providing the real assessment of the conducted training 
(Kirkpatrick, 2006). Perhaps the most frequent type of measurement is the reaction level 
because it is the easiest to measure, yet it provides the least valuable data. Measuring 
results which affect the organization is considerably more difficult, thus it is conducted 
less frequently although it yields the most valuable information (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
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The first three-levels of evaluation, reaction, learning, and knowledge transfer, are 
largely "soft" measurements; however, decision-makers who approve such training 
programs prefer hard results (returns or impacts). This does not mean the first three are 
insignificant, indeed, their use is in tracking problems within the learning package. 
Reaction level evaluation informs the decision maker how relevant the training is to the 
work the learners perform. It essentially measures how well the training requirement 
analysis processes worked. Learning level evaluation informs about the degree of 
relevance that the training package worked to transfer the learning objectives from the 
training material to the learners as it actually measures how well the design and 
development processes worked. Knowledge transfer level evaluation provides 
information about the degree to which the learning has actually been applied to the 
learner's job. It measures how well the performance analysis process worked. Finally, 
results level evaluation provides information about the return on the conducted training 
investment. Decision-makers prefer this harder "result," although not necessarily in 
dollars and cents (Hayes, 2003). 
Phillips (1996) also writes that the value of information becomes greater as it goes 
up these levels of evaluation (from reaction to results). For example, the evaluation of 
results has the highest value of information to the organization, while reaction provides 
the least information. And like most levels of information, the ones that provide the best 
value are often more difficult to obtain. Thus, there is a tendency to do the easier levels, 
one and two, and obtain a little information about training efforts, while bypassing the 
more difficult levels three and four which would provide the most valuable information 
to the organization (Philips, 1996). 
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The main goal of the combat operational stress preventive training is to decrease 
the number of mental health cases (Gaskin, 2008). Based on this goal, Combat 
Operational Stress Control branch officers should look at the results level perspective. 
Did the conducted preventive training result in decreasing the number of mental health 
cases? If not, the training might be considered as ineffective. If yes, then the training 
probably was effective with other factors being equal. However, this study took a close 
look at all four levels, producing a thorough combat operational stress preventive training 
review. Only then, the study was able to help determine the full causes of the combat 
operational stress preventive training successes or failures. 
Summary 
There have been several significant national studies that investigated the issues of 
combat operational stress. Some of these studies focused on negative effects of combat 
operational stress (Kang & Hyams, 2004; Hoge et al., 2002, Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et 
al., 2006). Other studies looked at associations of combat exposure and ill effects of 
combat operational stress (Dohrenwend et al., 2007; Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999; 
Koenen, Stellman, Stellman, & Sommer, 2003; Adler, Vaitkus, & Martin, 1996; 
Southwick et al., 1995; Wolfe, Brown, & Kelley, 1993; Smith, et al., 2008; Iversen, Fear, 
& Ehlers, 2008). Still other studies explored the correlations of general military 
deployment stress factors such as deployment-related stressors, low-magnitude stressors, 
general overseas stressors, malevolent environment, and contextual stressors (Bartone, 
Vaitkus, & Adler, 1998; King, King, Gudanowski, & Vreven, 1995; Litz, King, King, 
Orsillo, & Friedman, 1997; Engelhard & van den Hout, 2007; Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, 
Ehlich, & Batres, 1997). However, none of these studies explored the effectiveness of the 
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combat operational stress preventive training activities as a way to prevent mental health 
problems. 
This study sought to fill this important gap and determine the effectiveness of the 
currently offered Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training services. 
First, the study gathered quantitative data to determine whether the respondents' self-
reported experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. Second, the study 
collected quantitative and qualitative data to determine the actual efficacy of the Marine 
Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education services for both the 
enlisted Marines and officers. These understandings could benefit Combat Operational 
Stress Control officers from all the Services on how to improve combat operational stress 
preventive training and education activities, thus contribute to the preservation of our 
Nation's military combat troops. 
The next chapter describes how the study's design sought to accomplish these end 




The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Combat 
Operational Stress Control training program. This evaluation entailed both qualitative and 
quantitative inquiries of the combat operational stress preventive training to determine 
whether the program meets the training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. The 
researcher used reaction to training, learning through training, knowledge transfer, and 
long-term training results as the key training effectiveness constructs (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Specifically, a quantitative investigation took place to explore the individual experiences 
of Marines who were subjected to combat operational stress. The results of this statistical 
quantitative analysis provided insights to the effectiveness of combat operational stress 
preventive training. 
Additionally, a qualitative analysis of preventive training sessions was conducted 
by investigating individual experiences that gave meaning to decisions why the combat 
operational stress preventive training was effective or ineffective. A qualitative approach 
allowed the individual experiences to speak for themselves providing intrinsic 
perceptions to the real effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training 
(Creswell, 2007). Together, the qualitative and the quantitative inquiries added 
immensely to the validity of this study, thus directly benefitting our Nation's combat 
troops. 
Population 
The study took place at Marine Corps Bases, Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, 
North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, California. The participants consisted of active 
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duty and reserve Marines on active duty. For the purposes of quantitative analysis, the 
researcher sought to obtain a random sample greater than 384 Marines. The current 
Marine Corps active duty population consists of about 202,000 Marines (Global Security, 
2009). Based on Cochran's (1977) formula, a random sample consisting of at least 384 
Marines is required for making generalizations about the entire active Marine Corps 
population. 
The sample size for qualitative inquiry was based on qualitative data saturation as 
recommended by Creswell (2007). The researcher planned to reach the point of sample 
data saturation after performing qualitative interviews using a purposefully stratified 
sample of Marines. Specifically, this qualitative sample consisted of four junior non-
commissioned Marines, four staff non-commissioned officers, and four commissioned 
officers. Additionally, the researcher hoped to reach the point of qualitative sample data 
saturation after observing four combat operational stress preventive training classes. 
Research Variables 
The study's data were to determine how the respondents' self-reported 
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training. The 
variables from this data set included suffering from effects of combat operational stress, 
training effectiveness and evaluation constructs, and general military background 
biographical data. Suffering from effects of combat operational stress constituted the 
dependent variable, with the other three variable groups constituted the independent 
variables. 
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This study also investigated the individual experiences of Marines who completed 
the combat operational stress preventive training. The independent variables consisted of 
Kirkpatrick's (2006) training evaluation constructs, biographical information of the 
participants, possessing combat operational stress preventive coping skills, the 
effectiveness of the trainers, the effectiveness of the training materials, and overall 
feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training. Training evaluation 
constructs included reaction, learning, changed behavior, and long-term results. The 
dependent variable consisted of individual perceptions of whether the combat operational 
stress preventive training was effective or ineffective. 
Research Design 
This was a mixed method research design consisting of quantitative and 
qualitative inquiries. Since this study involved both quantitative and qualitative inquiries, 
there were three data collection instruments. For the purposes of quantitative inquiries, an 
online based survey was utilized. This survey contained a number of Likert scale type 
questions built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level training evaluation constructs: 
reaction, learning, changed behavior, and long-term results (see Appendices A and D). 
Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the researcher conducted interviews using an 
interview protocol form, which contained a number of open-ended interview questions 
related to the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (see 
Appendix B). These questions were also built around Kirkpatrick four-level training 
evaluation constructs (see Appendix E). Additionally, the researcher conducted four 
qualitative observations of training sessions using an observation protocol instrument. 
The observation protocol instrument contained checklist items that are relevant to 
training and conducting productive observation sessions (see Appendix C). 
The researcher established validity and reliability of the above instruments by 
means of expert review and pilot testing. Specifically, following approval of the proposed 
research process, the researcher submitted an initial draft of the instruments for review by 
a panel of experts to evaluate the appropriateness of content and ensure validity. The 
panel of experts consisted of three external Ph.D. subject matter experts who possessed 
requisite prior experience working with data collection instrumentations. After review 
and feedback from the experts, the researcher conducted a pilot test of the survey to 
ensure reliability for contextual relevance to Marines with a variety of backgrounds. The 
researcher accomplished this by means of a convenience sampling method. This method 
involved testing the quantitative survey with 10 Quantico, Virginia, based Marines who 
were not part of the actual quantitative study sample. The qualitative instrument was also 
tested with three Quantico, Virginia, based Marines who also were not part of the actual 
qualitative study sample. 
Method of Data Collection 
The researcher sent an e-mail to Commanding Officers of randomly selected five 
Marine Corps units each consisting of about 1,000 Marines and located at Marine Corps 
Bases, Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, 
California. The units were selected using the Microsoft" Excel™ random number 
generator. The sent e-mail contained a link to the web-based survey and requested each 
respective unit Commanding Officer to forward that e-mail to all members of his or her 
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unit in order to allow the members to voluntarily and anonymously access and complete 
the survey. 
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, the researcher performed individual 
interviews with Marines using a purposefully stratified sample. This qualitative sample 
consisted of four enlisted Marines, four staff non-commissioned officers, and four 
commissioned officers. Additionally, the researcher planned to observe and reach the 
point of qualitative data saturation after witnessing four combat operational stress 
preventive training sessions in order to collect qualitative data related to the effectiveness 
of the combat operational stress preventive training. 
Statistical Analysis 
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, the researcher utilized the statistical 
analysis software, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 17.0: SPSS Base 
(SPSS), to analyze the datasets. SPSS was also used to create tables and figures to display 
comparisons of information. Explicitly, both descriptive and inferential statistical 
methods were used. The descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to organize, 
summarize, and describe the associated data. The inferential statistical methods provided 
the researcher the opportunities to make predictions about the characteristics of the 
Marine Corps population. 
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, the researcher analyzed data by using 
interpretational analysis techniques. Interpretational analysis involves systematic 
procedures to code and classify qualitative data to ensure that important themes and 
patterns emerge (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 1999). Interpretational analysis offers several 
specific steps: preparing a database containing all the data, numbering each line of text 
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sequentially and then dividing the text into meaningful segments, developing meaningful 
categories to code the data; coding each segment by any and all categories that apply to 
it; and then generating specific themes and constructs that emerge from the categories. 
Logistic regression can be used to predict a dependent variable on the basis of 
categorical independent variables and determine the percent of variance in the dependent 
variable explained by the independents; rank the relative importance of independents; 
assess interaction effects; and understand the impact of covariate control variables 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). The impact of predictor variables can also be explained in 
terms of odds ratios (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
Research Question 1 focused on whether the respondents' self-reported 
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training. It was 
answered by means of a dataset collected by the researcher. First, descriptive statistics 
were used consisting of frequencies and percentages in order to organize, summarize, and 
describe the data. Then, the researcher followed the analysis with binary logistic 
regressions in order to assess the associations between the demographic variables, 
training evaluation constructs, and self-reported experiences of effects from combat 
operational stress. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic regressions to 
determine the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for each 
variable of interest. 
Research Question 2 focused on whether the Combat Operational Stress Control 
training program for Marine officers meets the training effectiveness criteria of the 
Marine Corps. Research Question 3 focused on whether the Combat Operational Stress 
Control training program for enlisted Marines meets the training effectiveness criteria of 
the Marine Corps? The study answered these questions by using both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies. For the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics consisting 
of frequencies and percentages were used in order to organize, summarize, and describe 
the data. The researcher followed the above with binary logistic regressions in order to 
assess the associations between the demographic characteristics, impressions of the 
received combat operational stress preventive training, learning specific facts/techniques, 
actually using the learned skills/techniques, and individual perceptions whether the 
training was effective or ineffective. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic 
regressions to determine the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals 
(CIs) for each variable of interest. 
Qualitative analysis of data collected to answer Research Questions 2 and 3 were 
also performed. Specifically, the researcher transcribed all interview data from a 
recording device into a typed text. Each line of typed text was then divided into 
meaningful segments. The researcher accomplished this by having each interview 
question and the participant's response as a separate segment as recommended by 
Creswell (2007). By having separate segments, the researcher was able to code the data 
according to the specific themes related to training effectiveness constructs, such as 
reaction, learning, changed behavior, and long-term results. A similar data analysis 
methodology was applied to the observation based dataset. Conclusions were first drawn 
from the data obtained individually from interviews and observations, and then from the 
data as a whole, having the two categories combined as one set of qualitative data as 
recommended by Creswell (2007). 
70 
Summary 
This chapter opened with a purpose of the study and the study inquiry procedures. 
It described the study's population, samples, and research variables. The fourth section 
reviewed instrument design, while the fifth section explained the methods of data 
collection. Finally, the last section identified the statistical analyses used in the study. 
The study's population consists of about 202,000 active duty Marines (Global 
Security, 2009). According to Cochran's (1977) formula, a quantitative sample of at least 
384 Marines is needed to allow the researcher to generalize the study's findings to the 
entire Marine Corps population. Consequently, the researcher hoped to obtain a sample 
greater than 384 Marines to generalize the study's findings to the entire Marine Corps 
population. Additionally, the researcher hoped to reach the point of qualitative data 
saturation after conducting 12 individual interviews and observing four training sessions. 
As a result, the researcher planned to obtain sufficient data to perform thorough analyses 
and subsequently reach conclusions. 
Chapter IV reports the findings from these analyses. Biographical information 
from the study's surveys is used to describe the participants. The data analyses are then 




This study was conducted from September through November 2009 at the Marine 
Corps Bases, Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, 
California. The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
United States Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training program. This 
evaluation entailed both qualitative and quantitative inquiries of the combat operational 
stress preventive training to determine whether the program meets the training 
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. Specifically, a quantitative investigation took 
place to explore the individual experiences of Marines who were subjected to combat 
operational stress. The results of this statistical quantitative analysis provided insights to 
the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. 
Additionally, a qualitative case study analysis of preventive training sessions was 
conducted by investigating individual experiences that gave meaning to decisions why 
the combat operational stress preventive training was effective or ineffective. A 
qualitative approach allowed the individual experiences to speak for themselves 
providing intrinsic perceptions to the real effectiveness of the combat operational stress 
preventive training (Creswell, 2007). Together, the qualitative and quantitative inquiries 
added immensely to the validity of this study, thus directly benefitting our Nation's 
combat troops. 
Following this introduction is an overview of participants, including their 
demographic characteristics. Next, the findings section appears ordered by the two 
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research methodologies used in this study. Each analysis section reviews procedures used 
and analyses outcomes. 
Overview 
The participants consisted of active duty and reserve Marines on active duty. For 
the purposes of quantitative analysis, the researcher obtained a random sample of 480 
Marines. The current Marine Corps active duty population consists of about 202,000 
Marines (Global Security, 2009). Based on Cochran's (1977) formula, a random sample 
consisting of at least 384 Marines was required for making generalizations about the 
entire Marine Corps population. This study's quantitative random sample of 480 Marines 
exceeded the minimum threshold of 384 Marines, thus allowing the researcher to make 
generalizations about the entire Marine Corps population. The study's respondents 
completed an online based survey. This survey contained a number of Likert scale type 
questions built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level training effectiveness constructs: 
reaction, learning, changed behavior, and training effectiveness/long-term results (see 
Appendices A and D). 
Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the researcher reached the point of qualitative 
data saturation after interviewing 12 Marines selected by means of a purposefully 
stratified sample. This qualitative sample consisted of four junior enlisted Marines, four 
senior enlisted Marines, and four commissioned officers. Additionally, the researcher 
reached the point of qualitative data saturation after observing four combat operational 
stress preventive training sessions. Specifically, the four observed training sessions 
consisted of 924 observed Marines. Out of the observed 924 Marines, 693 were enlisted 
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Marines and 231 were officers. This observed sample of 924 Marines was also sufficient 
to reach the point of qualitative sample data saturation (Creswell, 2007). 
Demographic Characteristics 
The demographic section of the quantitative survey contained a forced-choice 
format to gather information about the respondents' Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS), age, years served on active duty, gender, rank, current component status (active 
duty, active duty reserve, selected reserve [mobilized], selected reserve [drilling], and 
individual ready reserve [IRR]). Respondents representing combat arms, combat support, 
and aviation military occupational specialties comprised over half of the sample (51.30 
percent). Almost one-third of the sample (32.70 percent) reported ages between 20 and 
25 years old. Likewise, over one-third of the respondents (33.89 percent) had been on 
active duty between one and five years. A great majority of the respondents were males 
(90.60 percent), which approximately corresponds to gender composition of the Marine 
Corps active duty population (USMC, 2009). Nearly half of the respondents were enlisted 
Marines with ranks of private, private first class, lance corporal, corporal, and sergeant 
(43.80 percent). Finally, most of the participants were active duty Marines (92.90 
percent). Demographic characteristics of the participants are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n = 480) 
Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Military Occupational Specialty 
Combat Arms 90 18.80% 
Combat Support 84 17.50% 
74 
Table 1 (continued) 
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n = 480) 
Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Military Occupational Specialty 
Aviation 










































Years in the Military 
1-5 165 34.40% 
6-10 138 28.80% 
11-15 83 17.30% 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n = 480) 
Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
16-20 
21-25 
25 and more 
Males 
Females 
Enlisted (E-l through E-3) 
Non-commissioned Officer 
Staff Non-commissioned Officer 
Warrant Officer 
Commissioned Officer 













Active Duty (AD) 
Active Duty Reserve (AR) 
Selected Reserve (Mobilized) 
Selected Reserve (Drilling) 
























The researcher evaluated each logistic regression model for reliability. First the 
researcher evaluated each model's^ goodness-of-fit test verifying significant^ of the 
model (p < .05). Significant fallowed the researcher to conclude the set of independent 
variables improves prediction of outcomes (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). Next, the 
researcher confirmed the insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit (p > .05) 
tests in order to accept the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis constitutes differences 
between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable (Meyers, Gamst, & 
Guarino, 2006). Finally, the researcher verified both the Cox and Snell and the 
Nagelkerke tests in order to confirm pseudo R of the models. Pseudo R provide the 
percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables 
(Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). Only after verifying the validity of the models 
through the above indicated tests, the researcher determined the models are suitable for 
making predictions and inferences related to this study. 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1 focused on whether the respondents' self-reported 
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training. Research 
Question 2 focused on whether the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive 
training program for Marine officers meets the training effectiveness criteria of the 
Marine Corps. Research Question 3 focused on whether the Marine Corps combat 
operational stress preventive training program for enlisted Marines meets the training 
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. The researcher answered these questions using 
77 
the quantitative and qualitative mixed methodology. For the quantitative methodology, 
the researcher used a series of binary logistic regression models to assess the associations 
between the biographic characteristics, Kirkpatrick's (2006) training evaluation 
constructs, self-reported experiences of effects from combat operational stress which 
included suffering from combat operational stress, the effectiveness of the combat 
operational stress preventive training, combat operational stress coping skills, and using 
the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives. For the qualitative methodology, the 
researcher performed 12 interviews with four junior enlisted Marines, four senior enlisted 
Marines, and four commissioned Marine officers. Additionally, the researcher observed 
four combat operational stress control training sessions consisting of 924 observed 
Marines. These observation sessions provided qualitative insights to the training quality, 
interest level of the learners, and the effectiveness of the observed trainers. 
Quantitative Methodology 
The training evaluation section of the quantitative survey contained a forced-
choice format to gather information about the respondents' opinion regarding evaluation 
and the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. Table 2 depicts 
results of the descriptive statistics of the training evaluation section of the quantitative 
survey. 
Concerning the inferential statistics, the researcher conducted evaluations of a 
number of simultaneous binary logistic regressions models designed and run to answer 
the subject matter research questions. Dependent variables consisted of (1) suffering from 
effects of combat operational stress; (2) the effectiveness of the combat operational stress 
preventive training; (3) overall feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive 
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training; (4) changed behavior as a result of using the learned combat operational stress 
preventive skills in Marines' daily lives; (5) learning the combat operational stress 
preventive skills and techniques; and (6) reacting to the presented combat operational 
stress preventive training. The following are the findings ordered by the dependent 
variables. 
Table 2 
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics (n = 480) 
Training Evaluation Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Have you ever attended combat operational stress preventive formal training classes? 
No 196 40.80% 
Yes 284 59.20% 
What were your impressions of the received training? 
Poor 11 2.30% 
Barely Acceptable 20 4.20% 
Neutral 354 73.80% 
Good 84 17.50% 
Outstanding 11 2.30% 
Did you learn specific principles, facts, and techniques during the training? 
No 171 35.60% 
Yes 309 64.40% 
Did you actually use any of the learned skills and techniques? 
No 321 66.90% 
Yes 159 33.10% 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics (n = 480) 
Training Evaluation Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the training? 
Poor 16 3.30% 
Barely Acceptable 29 6.00% 
Neutral 339 70.60% 
Good 87 18.10% 
Outstanding 9 1.90% 
Have you ever suffered from effects of combat operational stress? 
No 311 64.80% 
Yes 169 35.20% 
Was the received combat operational stress preventive training effective in helping you 
cope with effects of combat operational stress? 
No 47 9.80% 
Barely 28 5.80% 
Neutral 334 69.6% 
Some 59 12.30% 
Yes 12 2.5% 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the currently used combat operational stress 
training materials? 
Poor 17 3.50% 
Barely Acceptable 33 6.90% 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics (n = 480) 
Training Evaluation Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Neutral 346 72.10% 
Good 77 16.00% 
Outstanding 7 1.50% 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the trainers who actually presented the combat 
operational stress preventive training material? 
Poor 14 2.90% 
Barely Acceptable 33 6.90% 
Neutral 316 65.80% 
Good 91 19.00% 
Outstanding 26 5.40% 
What are your overall feelings about the combat operational stress preventive training 
program? 
Poor 22 4.60% 
Barely Acceptable 31 6.50% 
Neutral 310 64.60% 
Good 100 20.80% 
Outstanding 17 3.50% 
Suffering as the Dependent Variable 
The first significant logistic regression model in this series considered 
associations between the respondents' changed behavior (coded as ChangeBehavior) 
and rank (predictor variables) and suffering from effects of combat operational stress 
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(coded as Suffering). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model , / (2, n = 480) = 10.383,p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 64.8 
percent. Table 3 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported using the preventive skills in Marines' daily 
lives was a statistically significant predictor of suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress. 
Table 3 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with Changed 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 ChangeBehavior !618 9.457 !002 1.855 T~25l 2.750 
Rank -.227 1.224 .269 .797 .533 1.192 
Constant -.490 5.025 .025 .613 
The odds ratio for rank was .797. This implied the enlisted Marines were .797 
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from combat operational stress, 
controlling for the respondents' changed behavior (coded as Change_Behavior). The 
odds ratio for the respondents' changed behavior was 1.855 (p < .01). This implied when 
Marines used the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives, 
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they were 1.855 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat operational 
stress, controlling for rank. 
The next significant logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded as Coping) 
and rank (predictor variables) and suffering from effects of combat operational stress 
(coded as Suffering). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model, x (2, « = 480) = 14.079,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 66.3 
percent. Table 4 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported coping was a statistically significant predictor 
of suffering from effects combat operational stress. 
Table 4 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with Coping and 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(6) Lower Upper 
I Coping !948 13.098 !000 2.580 1.544 4.310 
Rank -.144 .483 .487 .866 .578 1.299 
Constant -.665 14.134 .000 .514 
The odds ratio for rank was .866. This implied the enlisted Marines were .866 
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from effects of combat operational 
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stress, controlling for the coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds ratio for coping was 
2.580 (p < .01). This implied when Marines reported possessing combat operational 
stress preventive coping skills, they were 2.580 times more likely to report suffering from 
effects of combat operational stress, controlling for rank. 
The next significant logistic regression model considered associations between 
participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor 
model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, y? 
(2, n = 480) = 12.748,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development 
of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 64.8 percent. Table 
5 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds 
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the training was a statistically 
significant predictor of suffering from effects of combat operational stress. 
Table 5 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I COSC Training ^86 11.407 Tool 1.986 1.334 2.957 
Rank -.263 1.622 .203 .769 .513 1.152 
Constant -.856 17.499 .000 .425 
The odds ratio for rank was .769. This implied the enlisted Marines were .769 
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from effects of combat operational 
stress, controlling for participating in the training (coded as COSC_Training). The odds 
ratio for participating in the training was 1.986 (p < .01). This implied when Marines 
reported participating in the combat operational stress preventive training, they were 
1.986 times more likely to suffer from effects of combat operational stress, controlling 
for rank. 
The next significant logistic regression model considered associations between 
the effectiveness of the training (coded as Training_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) 
and suffering from effects of combat operational stress. Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 2.365, p < .05. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 64.8 percent. Table 6 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the 
effectiveness of the training was a statistically significant predictor of suffering from 
effects of combat operational stress. 
The odds ratio for rank was .829. This implied the enlisted Marines were .829 
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from effects of combat operational 
stress, controlling for the effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for the 
effectiveness of the training was 1.324. This implied when Marines reported the training 
as being effective, they were 1.324 times more likely to suffer from effects of combat 
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operational stress, controlling for rank. Figure 1 depicts significant odds ratios for each of 
the independent variables described in Tables 3 through 6. 
Table 6 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with the 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Training_Effect 281 1.430 232 1.324 1?36 2.096 
Rank -.188 .850 .357 .829 .556 1.235 









Training Training Coping Changed Behavior 
Effectivenss Participation 
Independent Variables 
Figure 1. Significant Odds Ratios with Suffering as the Dependent Variable. 
Effectiveness of Training as the Dependent Variable 
The first significant logistic regression model in this series considered 
associations between the respondents' changed behavior (coded as ChangeBehavior) 
and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the training. Results of the 
logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically 
. I I I 
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significant improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 108.009,/? < .01. 
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively 
high, with an overall prediction success rate of 81.0 percent. Table 7 presents the 
regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], 
and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald 
test reported the respondents' changed behavior was a statistically significant predictor of 
the effectiveness of training activities. 
Table 7 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(2?) Lower Upper 
1 Change_Behavior 2.583 85.656 !000 13.238 7.660 22.876 
Rank -.454 2.672 .102 .635 .368 1.095 
Constant -2.377 73.749 .000 .093 
The odds ratio for rank was .635. This implied the enlisted Marines were .635 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational 
stress preventive training, controlling for the respondents' changed behavior (coded as 
ChangeBehavior). The odds ratio for the respondents' changed behavior was 13.238 (p 
< .01). This implied when Marines reported using the learned combat operational stress 
preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 13.238 times more likely to indicate the 
training was effective, controlling for rank. 
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' coping skills acquired by participating in the combat preventive stress 
training (coded as Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness 
of the training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor 
model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / 
(2, n = 480) = 112.484, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development 
of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.9 percent. 
Table 8 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, 
odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported coping was a statistically significant predictor of 
effective combat operational stress preventive training services. 
Table 8 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Coping 3.023 95.898 XXX) 20.557 11.225 37.647 
Rank -.035 .014 .904 .966 .549 1.699 
Constant -2.067 66.387 .000 .127 
The odds ratio for rank was .966. This implied the enlisted Marines were .966 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational 
stress preventive training, controlling for coping skills. The odds ratio for coping was 
20.557 (p < .01). This implied possessing the combat operational stress preventive coping 
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skills increased the odds by 20.557 times of indicating the training was effective, 
controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
COSC_Training) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the 
training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, % (2, n = 
480) = 80.944,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 80.0 percent. Table 9 
presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio 
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. 
The Wald test reported participating in the combat operational stress training was a 
statistically significant predictor of effective training services. 
Table 9 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of Training with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(S) Lower Upper 
1 COSC Training 2.947 38.855 !000 19.058 7.544 48.147 
Rank -.483 3.399 .065 .617 .369 1.031 
Constant -3.364 50.454 .000 .035 
The odds ratio for rank was .617. This implied the enlisted Marines were .617 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational 
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stress preventive training, controlling for participating in the combat operational stress 
preventive training. The odds ratio for participating in the combat operational stress 
preventive training was 19.058 (p < .01). This implied participating in the combat 
operational stress preventive training increased 19.058 times the odds of indicating the 
training was effective, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques 
(coded as Learning) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the 
training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n = 
480) = 72.794, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 80.0 percent. Table 
10 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds 
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported learning the combat operational stress related 
knowledge was a statistically significant predictor of effective training services. 
The odds ratio for rank was .816. This implied the enlisted Marines were .816 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational 
stress preventive training, controlling for learning. The odds ratio for learning was 23.999 
(p < .01). This implied Marines were 23.999 times more likely to consider the combat 
operational stress preventive training as being effective when they indicated actually 
learning the subject matter skills and techniques, controlling for rank. 
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Table 10 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 






















Constant -3.887 41.111 .000 .021 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the efficacy 
of the training materials (coded as MaterialEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and the 
effectiveness of training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model , / (2, n = 480) = 184.007,;? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 90.0 
percent. Table 11 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the efficacy of training materials was a 
statistically significant predictor of effective training services. 
The odds ratio for rank was .546. This implied the enlisted Marines were .546 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational 
stress preventive training, controlling for the efficacy of training materials (coded as 
MaterialEffect). The odds ratio for the efficacy of the training materials was 48.182 (p < 
.01). This implied Marines were 48.182 times more likely to consider the training as 
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being effective when they indicated the training materials were also effective, controlling 
for rank. 
Table 11 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 





Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(2?) Lower Upper 
1 MaterialEffect 3.875 132.927 !000 48.182 24.935 93.105 
Rank -.605 3.386 .066 .546 .287 1.040 
Constant -2.129 65.115 .000 .119 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' overall feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training 
(coded as OverallFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of 
the training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, y2 (2, N = 
480) = 174.738, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 87.3 percent. Table 12 presents 
the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio 
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. 
The Wald test reported the respondents' overall feelings toward the preventive combat 




Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 
Preventive Training with Overall Feelings and Rank as Independent Variables 
~ 95.0% CI 
for Exp(B) 
Variable 
Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Overall_Feel 3.461 131.883 XXX) 31.859 17.647 57.516 
Rank -.270 .742 .389 .546 .413 1.411 
Constant -2.264 76.970 .000 .070 
The odds ratio for rank was .546. This implied the enlisted Marines were .546 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the training, controlling 
for the respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training 
(coded as Overall_Feel). The odds ratio for the respondents' feelings toward the combat 
operational stress preventive training was 31.859 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 
31.859 times more likely to consider the training as being effective when they felt 
positively about the combat operational stress preventive training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' reaction toward the preventive combat operational stress training (coded as 
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the training. 
Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a 
statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n = 480) = 
211.472, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model 
was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 91.0 percent. Table 13 presents the 
regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], 
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and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald 
test reported the respondents' reaction toward the presented combat operational stress 
preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of effective training services. 
Table 13 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 
Preventive Training with Reaction and Rank as Independent Variables 
95.0% CI 
for Exp(B )̂ 
Variable 
Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(S) Lower Upper 
I Reaction 4.058 150.483 ioOO 57.873 30.261 110.680 
Rank -.605 3.386 .066 .546 .453 1.761 
Constant -2.276 72.892 .000 .065 
The odds ratio for rank was .546. This implied the enlisted Marines were .546 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the training, controlling 
for the respondents' reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction). The odds ratio for 
reaction was 57.873 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 57.873 times more likely to 
consider the training as being effective when they reacted positively toward the received 
training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' reported effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank 
(predictor variables) and the efficacy of the combat operational stress preventive training. 
Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a 
statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n = 480) = 
130.208, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model 
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was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 84.4 percent. Table 14 
presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio 
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. 
The Wald test reported the efficacy of the trainers was a statistically significant predictor 
of effective combat operational stress preventive training services. 
Table 14 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress 

































The odds ratio for rank was .817. This implied the enlisted Marines were .817 
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational 
stress preventive training, controlling for the efficacy of the trainers (coded as 
TrainerEffect). The odds ratio for the efficacy of the trainers was 17.831. This implied 
Marines were 17.831 times more likely to consider the combat operational stress 
preventive training as being effective when they indicated the trainers who conducted the 
training were proficient, controlling for rank. Figure 2 depicts significant odds ratios for 












Oianged Coping Training Learning Materials Overall Feelings Reaction Trainer 
Behavior Participation Effectiveness Effectiveness 
Independent Variables 
Figure 2. Significant Odds Ratios with Training Effectiveness as the Dependent Variable. 
Coping as the Dependent Variable 
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between 
the respondents' changed behavior as a result of using combat operational stress 
preventive skills in their daily lives (coded as Changed_Behavior) and rank (predictor 
variables) and the reported possession of coping skills. Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, /* (2, n = 480) = 84.859,/? < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively high, with an 
overall prediction success rate of 85.2 percent. Table 15 presents the regression 
coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
changed behavior and rank were statistically significant predictors for possession of the 
preventive combat operational stress coping skills. 
The odds ratio for rank was .506 (p < .05). This implied the enlisted Marines were 
.506 times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress 
preventive coping skills by participating in the training, controlling for changed behavior 
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(coded as ChangeBehavior). The odds ratio for changed behavior was 13.052 (p < .01). 
This implied Marines were 13.052 times more likely to indicate possessing the combat 
operational stress preventive coping skills when they pragmatically used the learned 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank. 
Table 15 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I Change_Behavior 2.569 62.767 !oOO 13.052 6.913 24.643 
Rank -.681 .299 .023 .506 .282 .910 
Constant -2.683 72.638 .000 .068 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between participating 
in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as COSC_Training) and rank 
(predictor variables) and the reported possession of the combat operational stress 
preventive coping skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 58.577,p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 
85.2 percent. Table 16 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat 
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operational stress preventive training and rank were statistically significant predictors of 
possessing effective coping skills. 
Table 16 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I COSCJTraining 2.778 27.767 !000 16.086 5.724 45.207 
Rank -.677 5.748 .017 .508 .292 .884 
Constant -3.496 44.652 .000 .030 
The odds ratio for rank was .508. This implied the enlisted Marines were .508 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills, controlling for participation in the training (coded as COSCTraining). The 
odds ratio for participation in the training was 16.086. This implied Marines were 16.086 
times more likely to possess the combat operational stress preventive coping skills when 
they participated in the training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between learning the 
combat operational stress preventive training material (coded as Learning) and rank 
(predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping skills. Results of the logistic 
regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 43.579,p < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively high, with an 
overall prediction success rate of 85.2 percent. Table 17 presents the regression 
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coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques was a statistically 
significant predictor of having effective coping skills. 
Table 17 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Learning 2.440 21.616 !000 11.474 4.102 32.095 
Rank -.424 2.382 .123 .655 .382 1.121 
Constant -3.453 41.930 .000 .032 
The odds ratio for rank was .655. This implied the enlisted Marines were .655 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills, controlling for learning (coded as Learning). The odds ratio for learning 
was 11.474. This implied Marines were 11.474 times more likely to consider possessing 
the combat operational stress preventive coping skills when they reported learning the 
training material, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' overall feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training 
(coded as OverallFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of 
coping skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / 2 (2, n = 
99 
480) = 107.425,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 84.6 percent. Table 
18 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds 
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported the respondents' overall feelings toward the combat 
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of 
possessing effective coping skills. 
Table 18 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I OverailjFeei 2.158 71.951 XXX) 8.650 5.254 14.241 
Rank -.398 1.626 .672 .655 .364 1.238 
Constant -8.908 88.792 .000 .000 
The odds ratio for rank was .655. This implied the enlisted Marines were .655 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills, controlling for the overall feelings toward the training (coded as 
OverallFeel). The odds ratio for the overall feelings toward the training was 8.650 (p < 
.01). This implied Marines were 8.650 times more likely to possess the combat 
operational stress preventive coping skills when they indicated having positive feelings 
toward the training, controlling for rank. 
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' reaction toward the presented combat operational stress preventive training 
(coded as Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping 
skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, rf (2, n = 
480) = 87.400, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 percent. Table 
19 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds 
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported positive reaction was a statistically significant predictor 
of possessing effective coping skills. 
Table 19 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(Z?) Lower Upper 
I Reaction 2.595 78.832 !000 13.402 7.557 23.769 
Rank -.401 1.768 .184 .670 .371 1.209 
Constant -2.406 75.171 .000 .090 
The odds ratio for rank was .670. This implied the enlisted Marines were .670 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills, controlling for reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction). The odds 
ratio for reaction was 13.402 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.402 times more 
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likely to possess the combat operational stress preventive coping skills when they had a 
positive reaction toward the training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' suffering as a result of the combat operational stress (coded as Suffering) 
and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping skills. Results of the 
logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically 
significant improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 15.968, p < .01. 
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively 
high, with an overall prediction success rate of 85.2 percent. Table 20 presents the 
regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], 
and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald 
test reported suffering was a statistically significant predictor of possessing effective 
coping skills. 
Table 20 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I Suffering ^948 13.098 !(J00 2.580 1.544 4.310 
Rank -.417 2.417 .120 .659 .389 1.115 
Constant -1.891 56.917 .000 .151 
The odds ratio for rank was .659. This implied the enlisted Marines were .659 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
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coping skills, controlling for suffering as a result of combat operational stress (coded as 
Suffering). The odds ratio for suffering was 2.580 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 
2.580 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress preventive coping skills 
when they reported having suffered from effects of combat operational stress, controlling 
for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and 
the reported possession of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills. Results 
of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a 
statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 
94.705, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model 
was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 percent. Table 21 
presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio 
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. 
The Wald test reported the effectiveness of the trainers was a statistically significant 
predictor of possessing the combat operational stress preventive coping skills. 
The odds ratio for rank was .635. This implied the enlisted Marines were .635 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect). 
The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 14.495 (p < .01). This implied 
Marines were 14.495 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress 




Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 TrainerEffect 2.674 78.660 1)00 14.495 8.028 26.171 
Rank -.454 2.248 .134 .635 .351 1.150 
Constant -2.604 76.748 .000 .074 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
TrainingEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping 
skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n = 
480) = 114.287, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.7 percent. Table 
22 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds 
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported the effectiveness of the combat operational stress 
preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of possessing effective coping 
skills. 
The odds ratio for rank was .651. This implied the enlisted Marines were .651 
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills, controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as Training_Effect). 
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The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training was 20.557 (p < .01). This implied 
Marines were 20.557 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress 
preventive coping skills when they considered the training as being effective, controlling 
for rank. 
Table 22 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 
Coping Skills with the Effectiveness of Training and Rank as Independent Variables 
95.0% CI 
for Exp(B )̂ 
Variable 
Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I TrainingEffect 3.023 95.898 !000 20.557 11.225 37.647 
Rank -.429 1.833 .176 .651 .350 1.212 
Constant -2.624 76.947 .000 .073 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the combat 
operational stress training materials (coded as TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor 
variables) and the reported possession of the combat operational stress preventive coping 
skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, rf (2, n = 
480) = 167.489, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 90.6 percent. Table 23 presents 
the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio 
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. 
The Wald test reported the combat operational stress preventive training materials and 
rank were statistically significant predictors of possessing effective coping skills. 
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Table 23 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress 
Coping Skills with the Efficacy of the Training Materials and Rank as Independent 
Variables 
Variable 
Step Entered B 
95.0% CI 
for Exp(B) 
Wald Significance Exp(B) Lower Upper 
1 TrainingMaterial 3.986 116.299 
Rank -1.017 7.166 
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Figure 3. Significant Odds Ratios with Coping Skills as the Dependent Variable. 
The odds ratio for rank was .362. This implied the enlisted Marines were .362 
times more likely than the officers to acquire combat operational stress coping skills, 
controlling for the efficacy of the training materials (coded as TrainingMaterial). The 
odds ratio for the efficacy of the training materials was 53.857 (p < .01). This implied 
Marines were 53.857 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress 
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preventive coping skills when they considered the preventive training materials as being 
effective, controlling for rank. Figure 3 depicts significant odds ratios for each of the 
independent variables described in Tables 15 through 23. 
Overall Feelings as the Dependent Variable 
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between 
the respondents' changed behavior (coded as Change_Behavior) and rank (predictor 
variables) and the reported feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive 
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model, x (2, n = 480) = 76.283, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 76.7 
percent. Table 24 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the respondents' changed behavior was a 
statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the training. 
Table 24 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I Change_Behavior 3.986 69.653 XJOO 7.064 26.098 111.145 
Rank -.245 .976 .323 .783 .481 1.273 
Constant -1.820 62.237 .000 .162 
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The odds ratio for rank was .783. This implied the enlisted Marines were .783 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for changed behavior as a result of using the learned skills 
in Marines' daily lives (coded as ChangeJBehavior). The odds ratio for changed behavior 
was 7.064 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.064 times more likely to feel positive 
about the combat operational stress preventive training when they indicated using the 
learned preventive skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' possession of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded 
as Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the preventive 
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 141.906, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in 
the development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate 
of 85.5 percent. Table 25 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the coping skills was a 
statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the training. 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.168. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.168 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for possessing the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds ratio for coping was 34.356 (p < .01). This 
implied Marines were 34.356 times more likely to feel positive about the combat 
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operational stress preventive training when they reported possessing the coping skills, 
controlling for rank. 
Table 25 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 

































The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' attendance of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the 
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 57.869, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 75.6 
percent. Table 26 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat operational stress 




Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 





Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 COSCJTraining L941 42.559 1)00 6.967 3.889 12.484 
Rank -.298 1.520 .218 .743 .463 1.192 
Constant -2.311 58.427 .000 .099 
The odds ratio for rank was .743. This implied the enlisted Marines were .743 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for participating in the training (coded as 
COSCTraining). The odds ratio for participating in the training was 6.967 (p < .01). 
This implied Marines were 6.967 times more likely to feel positive about the combat 
operational stress preventive training when they reported participating in the training, 
controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive training material (coded as 
Learning) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the training 
(coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 54.224, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 75.6 
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percent. Table 27 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported learning the combat operational stress skills 
and techniques was a statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the 
training. 
Table 27 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(Z?) Lower Upper 
I Learning 2.025 36.758 !000 7.577 3.937 14.582 
Rank -.078 .109 .741 .925 .581 1.471 
Constant -2.623 55.617 .000 .073 
The odds ratio for rank was .925. This implied the enlisted Marines were .925 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for learning the training material (coded as Learning). 
The odds ratio for learning was 7.577 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.577 times 
more likely to feel positive about the combat operational stress preventive training when 
they reported learning the subject matter skills and techniques, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' reaction toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings about the training 
(coded as Overall_Feel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
I l l 
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model , / (2, n = 480) = 156.701, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 
86.3 percent. Table 28 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported positively reacting to the combat 
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of feeling 
optimistic about the training. 
Table 28 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 
Preventive Training with Reaction and Rank as Independent Variables 
95.0% CI 
for Exp(B )̂ 
Variable 
Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(i?) Lower Upper 
i Reaction 3.250 123.907 !000 25.784 14.549 45.693 
Rank .040 .020 .888 1.041 .594 1.826 
Constant -2.076 65.666 .000 .125 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.041. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.041 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the preventive combat 
operational stress training, controlling for reaction toward the presented training (coded 
as Reaction). The odds ratio for reaction was 25.784 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 
25.784 times more likely to feel optimistic about the combat operational stress preventive 
training when they positively reacted toward the training, controlling for rank. 
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and 
the reported feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor 
model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x 
(2, n = 480) = 179.337, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development 
of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.7 percent. 
Table 29 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, 
odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported having effective trainers was a statistically significant 
predictor of feeling positively about the training. 
Table 29 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting of Positive Feelings toward the Combat Stress 





Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I TrainerEffect 3.313 141.801 !000 27.454 15.916 47.357 
Rank -.022 .006 .941 .978 .550 1.741 
Constant -2.321 72.049 .000 .098 
The odds ratio for rank was .978. This implied the enlisted Marines were .978 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as 
113 
TrainerEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 27.454 (p < .01). 
This implied Marines were 27.454 times more likely to feel positive about the combat 
operational stress preventive training when they characterized the trainers as being 
effective, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
Training_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the 
training (coded as Overall_Feel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 174.013, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in 
the development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate 
of 87.3 percent. Table 30 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the effectiveness of the combat 
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of feeling 
positive about the training. 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.037. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.037 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for the effectiveness of training (coded as 
TrainingEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of training was 31.859 (p < .01). 
This implied Marines were 31.859 times more likely to feel positive about the preventive 
combat operational stress training when they reported the training as being effective, 
controlling for rank. 
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Table 30 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 





Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I TrainingEffect 3.461 131.883 IKK) 31.859 17.647 57.516 
Rank .036 .015 .903 1.037 .581 1.851 
Constant -2.149 66.280 .000 .117 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as 
TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the 
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only mode l , / (2, n = 480) = 209.671, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in 
the development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 89.4 
percent. Table 31 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the combat operational stress training materials 
were a statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the training. 
The odds ratio for rank was .676. This implied the enlisted Marines were .676 
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress 
preventive training, controlling for the effectiveness of training materials (coded as 
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TrainingMaterial). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of training materials was 72.874 
(p < .01). This implied Marines were 72.874 times more likely to feel positive about the 
combat operational stress preventive training when they reported the training materials as 
being effective, controlling for rank. Figure 4 depicts significant odds ratios for each of 
the independent variables described in Tables 24 through 31. 
Table 31 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting of Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress 
Preventive Training with the Efficacy of Training Materials and Rank as Independent 
Variables 
Variable 











1 TrainingMaterial 4.289 119.474 
Rank -.392 1.597 
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Figure 4. Significant Odds Ratios with Overall Feelings as the Dependent Variable. 
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Changed Behavior as the Dependent Variable 
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between 
the reported level of combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded as Coping) 
and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the respondents' 
daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior). Results of the logistic regression analysis 
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over 
the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 82.719, p < .01. Prediction success for the 
cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction 
success rate of 75.8 percent. Table 32 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald 
statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence 
intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the 
combat operational stress preventive coping skills was a statistically significant predictor 
of using the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives. 
Table 32 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I Coping 2.569 62.767 iHH) 13.052 6.913 24.643 
Rank .408 2.910 .088 1.504 .941 2.403 
Constant -1.394 43.838 .000 .248 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.504. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.504 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned preventive combat operational stress 
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skills in their daily lives, controlling for possessing the coping skills (coded as Coping). 
The odds ratio for coping was 13.052 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.052 times 
more likely to use the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily 
lives when they reported possessing the coping skills, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' participation in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in 
the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior). Results of the logistic 
regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, y? (2, n = 480) = 67.263, p < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 66.9 percent. Table 33 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
participating in the combat operational stress preventive training was a statistically 
significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.046. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.046 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned preventive combat operational stress 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for participating in the training (coded as 
COSCTraining). The odds ratio for participating in the training was 6.090 (p < .01). 
This implied Marines were 6.090 times more likely to use the learned combat operational 
stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported participating in the training, 
controlling for rank. 
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Table 33 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 





Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 COSCTraining 1.807 54.180 !000 6.090 3.764 9.852 
Rank .045 .039 .844 1.046 .671 1.629 
Constant -1.951 56.963 .000 .142 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive training material (coded as 
Learning) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the 
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, rf (2, n = 480) = 101.845,p < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 67.7 percent. Table 34 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques was a statistically 
significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.342. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.342 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
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skills in their daily lives, controlling for learning (coded as Learning). The odds ratio for 
learning was 13.606 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.606 times more likely to use 
the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they 
reported learning the subject matter preventive skills and techniques, controlling for rank. 
Table 34 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 

































The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
OverallFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the 
Marines' daily lives (coded as ChangedBehavior). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 76.671, p < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 75.0 percent. Table 35 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported feeling 
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positive about the combat operational stress preventive training was a statistically 
significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
Table 35 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 
Lives with Overall Feelings toward the Training and Rank as Independent Variables 
95.0% CI 
for Exp(B )̂ 
Variable 
Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Overall_Feel I~955 69.653 XXX) 7.064 4.463 11.179 
Rank .268 1.339 .247 1.307 .831 2.057 
Constant -1.435 47.347 .000 .238 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.307. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.307 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for their feelings toward the training (coded as 
Overall_Feel). The odds ratio for feelings toward the training was 7.064 (p < .01). This 
implied Marines were 7.064 times more likely to use the learned combat operational 
stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported feeling positive about the 
training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' reaction toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the 
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 72.993, p < .01. Prediction 
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success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 75.0 percent. Table 36 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
positively reacting toward the combat operational stress preventive training was a 
statistically significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
Table 36 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 

































The odds ratio for rank was 1.378. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.378 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction). 
The odds ratio for reaction was 7.850 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.850 times 
more likely to use the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily 
lives when they reported positively reacting toward the presented training, controlling for 
rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' suffering from effects of combat operational stress (coded as Suffering) and 
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rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the Marines' daily lives 
(coded as ChangedBehavior). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model, j 2 (2, n = 480) = 10.132, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 66.9 
percent. Table 37 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported suffering from effects of combat operational 
stress was a statistically significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily 
lives. 
Table 37 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(2?) Lower Upper 
1 Suffering !618 9.457 i)02 L855 L25l 2.750 
Rank .208 .957 .328 1.231 .811 1.869 
Constant -1.076 29.739 .000 .341 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.231. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.231 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for suffering from effects of combat operational 
stress (coded as Suffering). The odds ratio for suffering was 1.855 (p < .01). This implied 
Marines were 1.855 times more likely to use the learned combat operational stress 
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preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as Trainer_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and 
actually using the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as 
Changed_Behavior). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 40.207, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 70.4 
percent. Table 38 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of the trainers was 
a statistically significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
Table 38 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I TrainerEffect 1.387 38.541 !000 4.002 2.583 6.200 
Rank .245 1.230 .267 1.277 .829 1.969 
Constant -1.252 39.697 .000 .286 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.277. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.277 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
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skills in their daily lives, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as 
TrainerEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 4.002 (p < .01). 
This implied Marines were 4.002 times more likely to use the learned combat operational 
stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported the trainers were effective 
in teaching the training content, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
Training_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the 
respondents' daily lives (coded as Changed_Behavior). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 107.672, p < .01. 
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with 
an overall prediction success rate of 78.1 percent. Table 39 presents the regression 
coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
the perceived effectiveness of the training was a statistically significant predictor of using 
the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
The odds ratio for rank was 1.445. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.445 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as 
Training_Effect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training was 13.238 (p < 
.01). This implied Marines were 13.238 times more likely to use the learned combat 
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operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported the subject 
matter training was effective, controlling for rank. 
Table 39 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 
Lives with the Effectiveness of the Training and Rank as Independent Variables 
Variable 
Step Entered 
























The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as 
TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor variables) and using the learned skills in the 
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 77.007, p < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 75.6 percent. Table 40 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the 
perceived effectiveness of the training materials was a statistically significant predictor of 
using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives. 
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The odds ratio for rank was 1.172. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.172 
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive 
skills in their daily lives, controlling for the perceived effectiveness of the training 
materials (coded as Training_Material). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the 
training materials was 9.359 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 9.359 times more 
likely to use the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives 
when they reported the training materials were effective, controlling for rank. Figure 5 
depicts significant odds ratios for each of the independent variables described in Tables 
32 through 40. 
Table 40 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I TrainingMaterial 2.236 64.679 !000 9.359 5.427 16.140 
Rank .158 .474 .491 1.172 .746 1.840 
Constant -1.248 39.751 .000 .287 
Learning as the Dependent Variable 
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between 
the reported level of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills and techniques 
(coded as Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter skills 
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Figure 5. Significant Odds Ratios with Changed Behavior as the Dependent Variable, 
the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the 
constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 41.364, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases 
used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success 
rate of 64.4 percent. Table 41 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the combat operational 
stress preventive coping skills was a statistically significant predictor of learning the 
training material. 
Table 41 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with 






















Constant .424 5.540 .019 1.529 
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The odds ratio for rank was .926. This implied the enlisted Marines were .926 
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills 
and techniques, controlling for possessing the coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds 
ratio for coping was 11.474 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 11.474 times more 
likely to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques when they 
reported possessing the coping skills, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter skills and 
techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 120.660, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in 
the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 
75.6 percent. Table 42 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat 
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of learning 
the preventive skills and techniques. 
The odds ratio for rank was .634. This implied the enlisted Marines were .634 
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills 
and techniques, controlling for participating in the training (coded as COSC_Training). 
The odds ratio for participating in the training was 9.636 (p < .01). This implied Marines 
were 9.636 times more likely to learn the subject matter skills and techniques when they 
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reported participating in the combat operational stress preventive the training, controlling 
for rank. 
Table 42 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with 

































The next logistic regression model considered associations between using the 
learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior) and rank 
(predictor variables) and learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and 
techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the 
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-
only model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 101.770, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in 
the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 
66.9 percent. Table 43 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported using the learned skills and 
techniques in the respondents' daily lives was a statistically significant predictor of 
learning the subject matter preventive skills and techniques. 
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Table 43 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning Skills and Techniques with Changed 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I Change_Behavior 2.610 61.593 !000 13.606 7.089 26.113 
Rank -.282 1.559 .212 .754 .485 1.174 
Constant .194 1.070 .301 1.214 
The odds ratio for rank was .754. This implied the enlisted Marines were .754 
times more likely than the officers to learn the skills and techniques, controlling for using 
the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior). The odds 
ratio for changed behavior was 13.606 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.606 times 
more likely to learn the subject matter skills and techniques when they reported using the 
learned skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
OverallJFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter preventive 
skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis 
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over 
the constant-only model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 54.538, p < .01. Prediction success for the 
cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction 
success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 44 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald 
statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence 
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intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported feeling positive 
about the combat operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant 
predictor of learning the subject matter skills and techniques. 
Table 44 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning Skills and Techniques with Overall 
Feelings toward the Training and Rank as Independent Variables 
95.0% CI 
for Exp(B )̂ 
Variable 
Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Overall_Feel 2.025 36.758 XXX) 7.577 3.937 14.582 
Rank -.141 .420 .517 .869 .568 1.329 
Constant .335 3.339 .068 1.398 
The odds ratio for rank was .869. This implied the enlisted Marines were .869 
times more likely than the officers to learn the skills and techniques, controlling for their 
feelings toward the training (coded as OverallFeel). The odds ratio for feelings toward 
the training was 7.577 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.577 times more likely to 
learn the skills and techniques when they reported feeling positive about the training, 
controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' reaction toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the combat operational stress 
preventive skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 65.271, p < .01. Prediction 
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success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 45 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
positively reacting toward the combat operational stress preventive training was a 
statistically significant predictor of learning the subject matter knowledge. 
Table 45 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Combat Stress Related 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Reaction 2.853 29.962 !(J00 17.341 6.243 48.165 
Rank -.100 .207 .649 .905 .590 1.389 
Constant .335 3.351 .067 1.399 
The odds ratio for rank was .905. This implied the enlisted Marines were .905 
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills 
and techniques, controlling for Marines' reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction). 
The odds ratio for reaction was 17.341 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 17.341 times 
more likely to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques when 
they reported positively reacting toward the presented training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as Trainer_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and 
learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques (coded as 
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Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n = 
480) = 94.705, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 percent. Table 46 presents 
the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio 
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. 
The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of the trainers was a statistically 
significant predictor of learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and 
techniques. 
Table 46 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(Z?) Lower Upper 
I TrainerEffect 2.674 78.660 !u00 14.495 8.028 26.171 
Rank -.454 2.248 .134 .635 .351 1.150 
Constant -2.604 76.748 .000 .074 
The odds ratio for rank was .635. This implied the enlisted Marines were .635 
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills 
and techniques, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as Trainer_Effect). 
The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 14.495 (p < .01). This implied 
Marines were 14.495 times more likely to learn the combat operational stress preventive 
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skills and techniques when they reported the trainers were effective in teaching the 
training content, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
TrainingEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter preventive 
skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis 
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over 
the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 72.383, p < .01. Prediction success for the 
cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction 
success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 47 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald 
statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence 
intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived 
effectiveness of the training was a statistically significant predictor of learning the 
combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques. 
Table 47 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with the 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(F) Lower Upper 
1 TrainingEffect 3.178 28.469 !000 23.999 7.468 77.123 
Rank -.104 .223 .637 .902 .586 1.386 
Constant .323 3.091 .079 1.381 
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The odds ratio for rank was .902. This implied the enlisted Marines were .902 
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills 
and techniques, controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as 
TrainingEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training was 23.999 (p < 
.01). This implied Marines were 23.999 times more likely to learn the combat operational 
stress preventive skills and techniques when they reported the training was effective, 
controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as 
Training_Material) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter 
preventive skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression 
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 66.832, p < .01. Prediction 
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 48 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the 
training materials were a statistically significant predictor of learning the combat 
operational stress preventive skills and techniques. 
The odds ratio for rank was .806. This implied the enlisted Marines were .806 
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills 
and techniques, controlling for the effectiveness of the training materials (coded as 
TrainingMaterial). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training materials was 
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30.824 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 30.824 times more likely to learn the combat 
operational stress preventive skills and techniques when they reported the training 
materials were effective, controlling for rank. Figure 6 depicts significant odds ratios for 
each of the independent variables described in Tables 41 through 48. 
Table 48 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with the 
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Figure 6. Significant Odds Ratios with Learning as the Dependent Variable. 
Reacting as the Dependent Variable 
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between 
the reported level of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded as 












as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model 
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n = 
480) = 85.769, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the 
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 84.6 percent. Table 
49 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds 
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each 
predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the combat operational stress preventive 
coping skills was a statistically significant predictor of reacting positively toward the 
presented training. 
Table 49 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
1 Coping 2.595 78.832 XXX) 13.402 7.557 23.769 
Rank -.094 .117 .733 .910 .532 1.559 
Constant -1.930 64.326 .000 .145 
The odds ratio for rank was .910. This implied the enlisted Marines were .910 
times more likely than the officers to react positively toward the preventive training, 
controlling for possessing the subject matter coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds 
ratio for coping was 13.402 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.402 times more 
likely to react positively toward the preventive training when they reported possessing the 
combat operational stress preventive coping skills, controlling for rank. 
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented 
training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model , / (2, n = 480) = 64.107, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 
80.2 percent. Table 50 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, 
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for 
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat 
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of positively 
reacting toward the presented training. 
Table 50 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I COSCTraining 2.393 38.480 IKX) 10.948 5.140 23.320 
Rank -.474 3.368 .066 .622 .375 1.033 
Constant -2.882 55.665 .000 .056 
The odds ratio for rank was .622. This implied the enlisted Marines were .622 
times more likely than the officers to react positively toward the presented training, 
controlling for participating in the training (coded as COSCTraining). The odds ratio for 
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participating in the training was 10.948 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 10.948 
times more likely to react positively toward the presented combat operational stress 
preventive training when they reported participating in the training, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between using the 
learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior) and rank 
(predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented combat operational stress 
preventive training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis 
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over 
the constant-only model, rf (2, n = 480) = 73.502, p < .01. Prediction success for the 
cases used in the development of the model was relatively high, with an overall 
prediction success rate of 80.2 percent. Table 51 presents the regression coefficients (B), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent 
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported using 
the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives was a statistically significant predictor of 
positively reacting toward the presented training. 
Table 51 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(£) Lower Upper 
i Change_Behavior 2.061 64.249 ^000 7.850 4.743 12.992 
Rank -.416 2.480 .115 .660 .393 1.107 
Constant -2.087 68.749 .000 .124 
The odds ratio for rank was .660. This implied the enlisted Marines were .660 
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented combat 
operational stress preventive training, controlling for using the learned skills in the 
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). The odds ratio for changed 
behavior was 7.850 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.850 times more likely to 
positively react toward the combat operational stress preventive training when they 
reported using the learned skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the 
respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
Overall_Feel) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented training 
(coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model , / (2, n = 480) = 157.598, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 
percent. Table 52 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported feeling optimistic about the combat operational 
stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of learning the subject 
matter preventive skills and techniques. 
The odds ratio for rank was .747. This implied the enlisted Marines were .747 
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented training, 
controlling for their feelings toward the training (coded as OverallFeel). The odds ratio 
for feelings toward the training was 25.784 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 25.784 
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times more likely to react positively toward the presented training when they reported 
feeling optimistic about the training, controlling for rank. 
Table 52 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with 

































The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and 
reacting toward the presented training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic 
regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant 
improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 132.649, p < .01. 
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was high, with an 
overall prediction success rate of 84.6 percent. Table 53 presents the regression 
coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported 
the perceived effectiveness of the trainers was a statistically significant predictor of 
positively reacting toward the combat operational stress preventive training. 
The odds ratio for rank was .793. This implied the enlisted Marines were .793 
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented training, 
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controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect). The odds ratio 
for the effectiveness of the trainers was 18.579 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 
18.579 times more likely to react positively toward the presented training when they 
reported the trainers were effective in teaching the training content, controlling for rank. 
Table 53 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with the 































The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as 
TrainingEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented training 
(coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model,/2 (2, n = 480) = 211.645, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 91.0 
percent. Table 54 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of the combat 
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operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of positively 
reacting toward the training. 
Table 54 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with the 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(5) Lower Upper 
I TrainingEffect 4.058 150.483 !000 57.873 30.261 110.680 
Rank -.184 .280 .597 .832 .421 1.644 
Constant -2.726 72.892 .000 .065 
The odds ratio for rank was .832. This implied the enlisted Marines were .832 
times more likely than the officers to react positively toward the presented training, 
controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as Training_Effect). The odds ratio 
for training effectiveness was 57.873 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 57.873 times 
more likely to react positively toward the presented combat operational stress preventive 
training when they reported the training was effective, controlling for rank. 
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as 
TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented 
training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only 
model , / (2, n = 480) = 143.516, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the 
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 87.7 
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percent. Table 55 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance 
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio 
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of training 
materials was a statistically significant predictor of positively reacting toward the 
presented training. 
Table 55 
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with 




Step Entered B Wald Significance Exp(2?) Lower Upper 
1 Training_Material 3.304 116.886 !000 27.222 14.955 49.551 
Rank -.530 3.071 .080 .588 .325 1.065 
Constant -2.002 65.005 .000 .135 
The odds ratio for rank was .588. This implied the enlisted Marines were .588 
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented combat 
operational stress preventive training, controlling for the perceived effectiveness of 
training materials (coded as Training_Material). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of 
training materials was 27.222 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 27.222 times more 
likely to positively react toward the presented combat operational stress preventive 
training when they reported the training materials were effective, controlling for rank. 
Figure 7 depicts significant odds ratios for each of the independent variables described in 
Tables 49 through 55. 
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Figure 7. Significant Odds Ratios with Positive Reaction as the Dependent Variable. 
Qualitative Methodology 
The primary purpose of the qualitative methodology was to supplement and 
support the quantitative methodology. Consequently, the researcher conducted training 
observations and interviews as part of data collection efforts to meet the objectives of this 
study. The researcher also used triangulation of data techniques in order to confirm and 
validate the findings as they emerged. This approach was based on the principle that no 
single technique could fully and objectively answer the research questions (Creswell, 
2007). By having two different qualitative methods, the researcher was able to 
objectively cross-check and confirm the emerging themes, interpretations, and 
conclusions. Specifically, the researcher compared observations with interviews in order 
to substantiate what the interview respondents voiced. The researcher also used a 
research log for keeping track of data and emerging understandings resultant from this 
inquiry. 
Data Analysis 
The researcher used spiral methodology technique to analyze the data collected in 
this study. Spiral methodology analysis involved systematic procedures to code and 
classify qualitative data to ensure that important themes and patterns emerged (Creswell, 
2007). It was also essential to reduce the data for analysis and allow for drawing and 
verifying appropriate conclusions (Creswell, 2007). Adhering to these principles, the 
researcher transcribed all interview data from the recording device into a typed text, and 
then divided the text into meaningful segments by having each interview question and the 
participant's response becoming a separate segment. As a result, the researcher was able 
to code the data according to the training effectiveness related themes, which included 
reaction, learning, knowledge transfer, and long term results. The researcher applied a 
similar data analysis methodology to the training observation data. Conclusions were 
drawn by looking at the data as a whole, having the two categories combined as one set 
of qualitative data as recommended by Creswell (2007). 
Qualitative Findings 
While this qualitative inquiry provided a plethora of information, the four 
dominant themes were dissatisfaction with training, being able to learn the basics, not 
applying the learned material in the field, and lack of long-term success of the training. 
Dissatisfaction with training refers to participants' negative perceptions of the combat 
operational stress preventive training. Being able to learn the basics refers to Marines 
successfully learning the combat operational stress preventive training essentials. Not 
applying the learned material in the field concerns Marines not actually putting into use 
new combat operational stress training knowledge in their daily lives. Finally, lack of 
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long-term success of the training concerns the combat operational stress preventive 
training not resulting in lasting tangible and quantifiable successes. 
Dissatisfaction with Training 
Almost all of the interviewed Marines expressed a general dissatisfaction with the 
combat operational stress preventive training. Four junior enlisted, three out of four 
senior enlisted Marines, and three out of four officers, described the training as one where 
"no one paid attention," which gave opportunities for "some sleep and respite", and 
referred to the instructors as "poor," leaving "lots of room for improvement." On the 
other hand, just two other interviewees, an officer and one senior enlisted Marine, called 
the training "an interesting talk" and "rather informative." The senior enlisted Marine 
also voiced "the instructor was pretty good, not great, but simply got the job done." 
Observing the training sessions resulted in similar findings. While the majority of 
the participants listened and paid attention, an estimated 15-20 percent of the observed 
participants were inattentive and visibly not trying to learn. These individuals elected to 
engage in sidebar conversations with fellow Marines, read other non-training materials, 
and even some Marines had difficulties remaining alert. Such negative signs of not 
paying attention to the instruction could be indicative of a poorly designed and delivered 
training activity (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Additionally, a review of post-training anonymous feedback forms suggested that 
the training slides were poorly designed and contained too much information, with many 
of the observed training participants describing the presentation slides as "confusing" and 
"hard to follow". Furthermore, many comments referred to a lack of instructor-learner 
interaction and not providing opportunities for learner involvement and exchanges either 
with the instructor or fellow students. The sheer number of the negative comments 
confirmed the current format of training, consisting of static PowerPoint™ slides, was 
not satisfactory. 
Ability to Learn the Basics 
In general, all of the interviewees indicated they understood what was meant by 
combat operational stress. They indicated this new knowledge came either from 
attending formal training sessions or informal training provided by their leaders. 
Moreover, 10 out of 12 interviewees pointed out they did not like the training because of 
a poor training delivery format as all the currently formatted training consists of lectures 
which utilize static PowerPoint™ slides. Eight interviewees also specified questionable 
knowledge and "unqualified" background of some instructors, which could translate into 
overall poor quality of the training sessions (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Ten out of 12 interviewees were also unable to identify specific techniques 
learned from the combat operational stress preventive training. Observing the training 
sessions did not provide insights into understanding whether participants actually learned 
the training material. The instructors asked the observed Marines basic questions and 
consequently received correct answers. Review of the post-training feedback forms also 
echoed the lack of learning specific skills and techniques. The training participants 
reported now being confused and puzzled by having too much information provided in 
such a short time. None of the post-training feedback forms indicated the training 
participants learned something new and useful in terms of practical knowledge, skills, 
and techniques. 
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Not Applying the Learned Material in the Field 
All of the interviewees also noted an inability to transfer knowledge from the 
training sessions. Additionally, three out of 12 interviewees alluded that the ability to 
transfer learning was "up to someone's personality and being able to maintain the 
composure." "It had nothing to do with the combat stress preventive training." All 
interviewed senior enlisted Marines and officers voiced that as far as actually seeing 
changed behavior in their Marines applying learned combat operational stress preventive 
skills in their daily lives, they "simply did not see it." The emerging theme from the 
qualitative comments was the current training format was not effective in having Marines 
apply the learned skills in their daily lives. 
Lack of Long-Term Success of the Training 
None of the interviewees reported any drastic decreases in new mental health 
cases, family related problems, alcohol, and drug abuse cases around their immediate 
working environments. The emerging theme was the training was not being effective in 
ensuring the long-term successes of the combat operational stress preventive training. 
This theme was triangulated with the program training documents and the Defense 
Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), which revealed meaningful statistical data. 
Specifically, the Marine Corps medical database showed increases in new mental health, 
PTSD, drug, and alcohol dependence and abuse cases amongst active duty Marines 
between years 2003 and 2008, resulting in re-emergence of the powerful theme of lack of 
the long-term success (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). 
Particularly, the number of new medically diagnosed mental health disorder cases, 
amongst active duty Marines, grew each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 
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Freedom. Since year 2003, the number of new mental health disorder cases grew by 
9,375 cases (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). This was a very serious increase and in most 
likelihood could be attributed to the Marine Corps' continued combat deployments to 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure 8 depicts the rise of new medically diagnosed mental health 
disorder cases in the Marine Corps between January 1, 2003 (11,972 new cases) and 
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Figure 8. New Mental Health Cases in the Marine Corps. 
Similarly, the number of new medically diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) cases grew each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Since 
year 2003, the number of new PTSD cases increased by 1,998 new cases which translated 
into a whopping 734 percent increase (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). Indeed, it was a very 
powerful statistic and very few would doubt this increase could not be attributed to the 
Marine Corps' continued participation in the current war effort and lack of the long-term 
success of the preventive combat operational stress training and education practices. 
Figure 9 depicts the rise of new medically diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) cases in the Marine Corps between January 1, 2003 (271 new cases) and 










2003 2004 2005 2006 
Year 
2007 2008 
Figure 9. New Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Cases in the Marine Corps. 
Additionally, after dropping slightly in years 2004 and 2005, the number of new 
medically diagnosed drug abuse or dependence cases grew sharply each year of 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Since year 2003, new drug abuse or 
dependence cases in the Marine Corps grew by 2,677 cases which translated into a 
considerable 98 percent increase (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). This increase had 
especially become evident during the last three years and in most likelihood could be 
correlated to "weariness of war participation" as perhaps some Marines did not see "the 
light at the end of the tunnel" and turned to drugs for stress relief. Figure 10 depicts the 
rise of new medically diagnosed drug abuse and dependence cases in the Marine Corps 
between January 1, 2003 (2,744 new cases) and December 31, 2008 (5,421 new cases) 
(DMSS, 2009). 
Likewise, after dropping slightly in year 2005, the number of new medically 
diagnosed alcohol abuse or dependence cases also grew in the Marine Corps. Since year 
2003, the number of new alcohol abuse or dependence cases increased by 715 cases 
which translated into a 22 percent increase (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). This increase 
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had also become evident during the last three years and probably could be correlated to 
"weariness of war participation" as more Marines turned to drinking for stress relief. 
Figure 11 depicts the rise of new medically diagnosed alcohol abuse and dependence 
cases in the Marine Corps between January 1, 2003 (3,212 new cases) and December 31, 
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Figure 11. New Alcohol Dependence and Abuse Cases in the Marine Corps. 
The above showed descriptions and qualitatively derived statistical data indicated 
rises in new mental health disorders, post traumatic stress disorders, substance 
dependence and abuse cases in the Marine Corps triangulated with what the interviewees 
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pointed out. Specifically, the currently formatted combat operational stress preventive 
training was not effective in ensuring the long-term successes of the training. This 
qualitative theme was particularly noteworthy and significant because it had also been 
triangulated by this study's quantitative descriptive and inferential statistical findings, 
which added immensely to its validity. 
Summary 
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed the majority of 
the Marines, regardless of rank, did not react favorably to the currently formatted combat 
operational stress preventive training. Some of the Marines learned the basics of the 
training, most of the Marines did not apply the learned preventive skills in their daily 
lives, and the currently formatted combat operational stress preventive training program 
for both the enlisted Marines and officers had not been a success as evidenced by a 
number of statistically significant logistic regressions, further supported by descriptive 
statistics, and finally triangulated by qualitative interviews and training observations. 
Additionally, the respondents' self-reported experiences of effects from combat 
operational stress do affect their evaluation of the effectiveness of the combat operational 
stress preventive training as evidenced by several statistically significant logistic 
regressions. 
Chapter V discusses the study's findings. It opens with a summary of the study. 
Next conclusions are presented for each of the research questions ordered by quantitative 
and qualitative inquiries. The findings are discussed relative to the theoretical and 
practical foundations used for this study. Finally, Chapter V closes with 
recommendations for use of this study and for future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the study, presents conclusions, and makes 
recommendations for use of this study. The conclusions discuss the findings from logistic 
regressions, descriptive statistics, and the qualitative methodology. The recommendations 
address uses for this study as well as ideas for future research in this area. 
Summary 
The problem investigated in this study was whether the Marine Corps combat 
operational stress preventive training program meets the training effectiveness criteria of 
the Marine Corps. There were three questions which guided this study: 
1. To what extent do the respondents' self-reported experiences of effects 
from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training? 
2. To what extent does the Marine Corps combat operational stress 
preventive training program for Marine officers meet the training 
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps? 
3. To what extent does the Marine Corps combat operational stress 
preventive training program for enlisted Marines meet the training 
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps? 
This study was significant in several aspects. Most important, this study is 
significant because it concerns our Nation's troops. Additionally, it would be difficult to 
develop a more effective combat operational stress preventive training program without 
first understanding the sense and meaning of the individual experiences of Marines who 
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perceived the training as effective or ineffective. Using insights from this research, the 
Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control program officers may improve their 
prevention program methodology thus positively contribute to the preservation of the 
Marine Corps forces. Theoretical significances for this study entailed investigating 
relationships between research variables and proposing research data collection 
instruments. These documents could also be used as templates for follow on 
investigations. 
Practical significances of the study included creating training evaluation 
methodologies. Such methodologies could also be used by other military and civilian 
training and education entities. Since this study focused on individual experiences, it may 
provide other researchers with insights essential for constructing quantitative instruments 
that could aid in predicting those being affected by effects of combat operational stress. 
Additionally, the study may provide other researchers with additional empirical 
knowledge which could be used in evaluating other training and education activities. 
The study faced several limitations related to its participants and the subject 
matter. First, the study was focused exclusively on active duty U.S. Marines. Second, 
preventive Combat Operational Stress Control consisted only of formal and informal 
training instituted and managed by the Combat Operational Stress Control branch of the 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Third, full disclosure of the participants' perceptions 
toward effects of combat operational stress and the effectiveness of the combat 
operational stress preventive training might have been hindered by reluctance of the 
individuals to disclose their feelings and opinions completely. Fourth, this study included 
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only volunteers as none of the Marine participants was forced or ordered to participate in 
the study. 
The participants consisted of active duty and reserve Marines on active duty 
stationed at the Marine Corps bases located in Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, North 
Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, California. For the purposes of the quantitative analysis, 
the researcher obtained a random sample of 480 Marines. The sample size for the 
qualitative inquiry was based on qualitative data saturation as recommended by Creswell 
(2007). The researcher reached the point of sample data saturation after performing 12 
qualitative interviews using a purposefully stratified sample of 12 Marines. 
There were three instruments used for this study. For the purposes of quantitative 
inquiry, an online based survey was utilized. This survey contained a number of Likert 
scale type questions built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level evaluation of training 
effectiveness constructs: reaction, learning, knowledge transfer, and long-term results. 
Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the researcher conducted interviews using an 
interview protocol form, which contained a number of open-ended interview questions 
related to the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. These 
questions were also built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level evaluation of training 
effectiveness constructs. An observation protocol instrument/checklist was used for the 
purposes of qualitative observations of training sessions. The observation protocol 
instrument contained checklist items that are relevant to training and conducting 
productive observation sessions. 
For the purposes of quantitative data collection, the researcher sent an e-mail to 
Commanding Officers of randomly selected five Marine Corps units each consisting of 
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about 1,000 Marines. The sent e-mail contained a link to the web-based survey and 
requested each respective unit Commanding Officer to forward that e-mail to all 
members of his or her unit in order to allow the members to voluntarily and anonymously 
access and complete the survey. As a result, the researcher obtained completed responses 
from 480 Marines. 
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, the researcher performed and then 
reached a qualitative data saturation after conducting 12 individual interviews with 
Marines using a purposefully stratified sample. This qualitative sample consisted of four 
enlisted Marines, four staff non-commissioned officers, and four commissioned officers. 
Additionally, the researcher observed and reached the point of qualitative data saturation 
after observing four combat operational stress training sessions in order to collect 
qualitative data related to the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive 
training. 
The researcher used both descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The 
descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to organize, summarize, and describe the 
associated data. The inferential statistical methods provided the researcher the 
opportunities to make predictions about the characteristics of the Marine Corps 
population. In order to answer Research Question 1, the researcher used descriptive 
statistics consisting of frequencies and percentages in order to organize, summarize, and 
describe the data. Then, the researcher followed the analysis with binary logistic 
regressions in order to assess the associations between the demographic variables, 
training evaluation constructs, and self-reported experiences of effects from combat 
related stress. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic regressions to 
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determine the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for each 
variable of interest. 
The researcher answered Research Questions 2 and 3 using both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies. For the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics consisting 
of frequencies and percentages were used in order to organize, summarize, and describe 
the data. The researcher followed this with binary logistic regressions in order to assess 
the associations between the demographic characteristics, impressions of the received 
combat operational stress preventive training, learning preventive combat operational 
stress concepts and techniques, actually using the learned skills and techniques, overall 
feelings toward the combat operational stress training, possessing combat operational 
stress coping skills, and individual perceptions whether the training was effective or 
ineffective. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic regressions to determine 
the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for each variable of 
interest. 
A qualitative analysis of data collected to answer Research Questions 2 and 3 
were also performed. A similar data analysis methodology was applied to the observation 
based dataset. Conclusions were first drawn from the data obtained individually from 
interviews, observations, and documents review and then from the data as a whole, 
having the three categories combined as one set of qualitative data as recommended by 
Creswell (2007). 
Quantitative Conclusions 
The following section outlines conclusions for each of the research questions. 
Conclusions were drawn by considering the study's results in the context of Kirkpatrick's 
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(2006) constructs for training evaluation: reaction, learning, changed behavior, and 
effectiveness of training/long terms results. 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 focused on whether the respondents' self-reported 
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training program. 
There were a number of findings which helped in answering the question. The following 
lists each specific finding followed by a discussion: 
Finding #1: The descriptive statistics reported that 169 respondents out of 480 
(35.20 percent) indicated suffering from effects of combat operational stress. This 
statistic supports findings of the prior studies which reported that approximately 30 
percent of the veterans who were deployed to recent combat zones might suffer from 
effects of combat operational stress (Iribarren, Prolo, Neagos, & Chiappelli, 2005). This 
is obviously a very serious outcome as potentially over one-third of the American combat 
Marines with prior deployment histories in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi 
Freedom might suffer from effects of combat operational stress with potentially severe 
implications on themselves. The researcher feels strongly these suggestions need to be 
taken seriously by the senior leadership in the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, 
and eventually Congress with appropriate preventive program actions enacted or 
instituted by these branches and agencies of the U.S. government. 
Finding #2: The first significant logistic regression model considered associations 
between the respondents' changed behavior and suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress. The odds ratio for changed behavior as a result of the Marines using 
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the learned combat operational stress preventive skills was 1.855 (p < .01). This implied 
when Marines used the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily 
lives, they were 1.855 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress. This finding was important because it showed the significance of using 
the learned skills and techniques in Marines' daily lives. Marines, by virtue of learning 
and then actually using the newly acquired skills and techniques, had a greater chance of 
disclosing their suffering from effects of combat operational stress. By knowing and 
understanding more about effects of combat operational stress, Marines were then better 
prepared to seek the needed help from mental health professionals (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 
2007). This is, in itself, a very positive outcome. This study had confirmed this fact and 
further supported the soundness and holistic value of properly instituted preventive 
training and education activities as recommended by Gaskin (2008) and Nash (2007) . 
Finding #3: The next significant logistic regression model considered associations 
between the respondents' possessing the combat operational stress coping skills and 
suffering from effects of combat operational stress. The odds ratio for possessing the 
coping skills was 2.580 (p < .01). This implied when Marines reported possessing the 
combat operational stress coping skills, they were 2.580 times more likely to disclose 
suffering from effects of combat operational stress. 
The Marine respondents should had acquired their preventive combat operational 
stress coping skills as a result of the subject matter training and education efforts. By 
possessing the requisite coping skills, the respondents had a significantly greater chance 
of disclosing their suffering from effects of combat operational stress. Similarly to the 
earlier finding, this result confirmed the importance of preventive training and education 
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services in terms of Marines' ability to learn and understand what it meant to suffer from 
effects of combat operational stress. As a result, the affected Marines were able to seek 
the needed help more effectively with positive effects upon themselves and their families. 
Such inherent abilities to seek needed help from mental health professionals was also one 
of the main goals of the preventive combat stress training and education efforts (Gaskin, 
2008, Nash, 2007). 
Finding #4: The next significant logistic regression model considered 
associations between participating in the combat operational stress preventive training 
and suffering from effects of combat operational stress. The odds ratio for participating in 
the combat operational stress preventive training was 1.986 (p < .01). This implied when 
Marines reported participating in the combat operational stress preventive training, they 
were 1.986 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat operational 
stress. 
This finding profoundly underscored the importance of preventive training and 
education efforts. Just sheer participation in formal combat operational stress preventive 
training classes significantly increased the likelihood of the respondents admitting they 
actually suffered from effects of combat operational stress. As a result, the affected 
Marines could seek the needed help being fully informed, which often means getting the 
mental health help quicker and before their mental health conditions actually worsen. 
This was also one of the main goals of the preventive combat operation stress control 
training (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007). 
Finding #5: The next significant logistic regression model considered associations 
between the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training and 
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suffering from effects of combat operational stress. The odds ratio for the effectiveness of 
the training was 1.324. This implied when Marines reported the training as being 
effective, they were 1.324 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress. This finding further stresses the importance of effective preventive 
training services. By knowing and understanding concepts related to combat operational 
stress preventive training and education efforts, Marines had a higher propensity to 
disclose their suffering from effects of combat operational stress as shown by this 
finding's logistic regression. This meant the affected Marines could then seek the needed 
help more effectively, which was essential from both the mental health care point of view 
and the efficacy of the preventive combat operational stress control training and 
education efforts (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007). Table 56 summarizes the findings used to 
answer Research Question 1. 
Table 56 
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Question 1 
Key Points for Findings 1 through 5 
Finding #1: 35.20 percent of the respondents disclosed suffering from effects of combat 
stress. 
Finding #2: When Marines reported using the learned combat operational stress 
preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 1.855 times more likely to disclose 
suffering from effects of combat operational stress. 
163 
Table 56 (continued) 
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Question 1 
Key Points for Findings 1 through 5 
Finding #3: When Marines reported possessing the combat operational stress coping 
skills, they were 2.580 times more likely to disclose suffering from effects of combat 
operational stress. 
Finding #4: When Marines reported participating in the combat operational stress 
preventive training, they were 1.986 times more likely to report suffering from effects of 
combat operational stress. 
Finding #5: When Marines reported the training as being effective, they were 1.324 
times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat operational stress. 
Research Questions 2 and 3 
Research Question 2 focused on whether the Marine Corps combat operational 
stress preventive training program for Marine officers meets the training effectiveness 
criteria of the Marine Corps. Research Question 3 focused on whether the Marine Corps 
combat operational stress preventive training program for enlisted Marines meets the 
training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. None of the logistic regressions was 
statistically significant in differentiating between the enlisted and the officers in terms of 
determining the effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of the combat operational stress 
preventive training. In other words, there were not reportable statistical differences 
between the officers and the enlisted Marines as far as reporting the effectiveness of the 
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combat operational stress preventive training. Hence, the following findings pertain 
equally to both groups - the enlisted Marines and the officers. 
Finding #1: From the descriptive statistics report, only 96 respondents out of 480 
(20.00 percent) considered the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive 
training either as fully effective or at least acceptable. This straightforward descriptive 
statistic was significant in itself because it powerfully showed the inherent shortcomings 
of the current combat operational stress preventive program as 80.00 percent of the 
respondents considered the training either as not fully effective or not effective at all. The 
Marine Corps needs to examine closely this area and consider this finding as 
unacceptable. This was because having an ineffective preventive training program 
negatively impacted the mental health of our Nation's combat Marines (Gaskin, 2008; 
Nash, 2007). 
Finding #2: The first significant logistic regression model in this series considered 
associations between the respondents' changed behavior as a result of using the learned 
subject matter skills and techniques in Marines' daily lives and the reported effectiveness 
of the combat operational stress preventive training. The odds ratio for changed behavior 
was 13.238 (p < .01). This implied when Marines reported using the learned combat 
operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 13.238 times more likely 
to indicate the training was effective. 
This finding had profound implications on the effectiveness and long term results 
of the combat operational stress preventive training. The Marine Corps, as an 
underwriting organization of the combat operational stress preventive training efforts, 
would greatly benefit from Marines actually changing their behavior by using the learned 
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combat operational stress preventive skills on a daily basis. This was because actually 
using the learned skills prevents occurrences of combat stress related illnesses and results 
in the long term success of the whole program - a very desirable end state (Gaskin, 2008; 
Nash, 2007). 
Finding #3: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' coping skills acquired by participating in the combat stress preventive 
training and the reported effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for possessing 
combat operational stress preventive coping skills was 20.557 (p < .01). This implied 
possessing the combat operational stress preventive coping skills increased the odds by 
20.557 times of indicating the training was effective. This finding further underscored the 
importance of the combat operational stress preventive training in ensuring the training 
participants actually acquired preventive coping skills. This was because possessing such 
skills significantly increased the chances of having an effective combat operational stress 
preventive training - an extremely desirable outcome. 
Finding #4: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training and the 
reported effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for participating in the combat 
operational stress preventive training was 19.058 (p < .01). This finding implied 
participating in the combat operational stress preventive training increased 19.058 times 
the odds of reporting the training was effective. It also further validated and showed the 
immense importance of the combat operational stress preventive training and education 
efforts. In this case, sheer participation in the training greatly increased the chances of 
indicating the entire training effort had been effective. The current program was 
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definitely less effective than it could have been since only 60 percent of the respondents 
reported attending any formal training classes. The Marine Corps leaders needed to 
ensure their Marines actually attended the preventive training classes. This was because 
participating in combat operational stress preventive training classes positively impacted 
the effectiveness of the whole training program, as shown by this finding's statistically 
significant logistic regression. 
Finding #5: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the efficacy of the training materials and the effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio 
for the effectiveness of the training materials was 48.182 (p < .01). This implied Marines 
were 48.182 times more likely to consider the training as being effective when they 
indicated the associated training materials were also effective. This finding was 
particularly important because it directly linked the efficacy of the training materials to 
the overall effectiveness of the training as suggested by this statistically significant 
logistic regression. Currently, only 84 out of 480 (17.50 percent) respondents considered 
the current format of the related training materials as at least acceptable. The associated 
logistic regression suggested an extremely strong relationship between the respondents' 
thinking of the training materials as effective and the overall efficacy of the presented 
training. 
The Marine Corps should be, therefore, concerned with ensuring the associated 
training materials were attractive to Marines in terms of usability, accessibility, 
readability, and actually helping them acquire the subject matter new knowledge. Ideally, 
the training materials should be experiential, which in itself often results in an enhanced 
post-training memory retention of the presented learning materials as recommended by 
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Knowles (1984) and Kirkpatrick (2006). As of now, there were too many Marines who 
reported the current state of the training materials as poor and ineffectual. Since, there 
was a direct relationship between the quality of the training materials and the 
effectiveness of the training (Kirkpatrick, 2006), the Marine Corps needed to ensure the 
combat operational stress preventive training materials possess an appropriate level of 
quality to reflect what Marines wanted and needed. Otherwise, the effectiveness of the 
whole combat operational stress preventive training program could be and unfortunately 
had been negatively impacted. 
Finding #6: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' overall feelings toward the preventive combat operational stress training 
and the effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for the Marines' overall feelings 
toward the preventive combat operational stress training was 31.859 (p < .01). This 
implied Marines were 31.859 times more likely to consider the subject matter preventive 
training as being effective when they indicated having positive feelings toward the 
combat operational stress preventive training. 
The implications of this finding were also significant. Marines' positive feelings 
toward the combat operational stress training were directly related to the effectiveness of 
the whole training program. Currently, only 117 out of 480 (24.30 percent) respondents 
reported having definitely positive feelings about the combat operational stress 
preventive training program. The associated logistic regression suggested an extremely 
strong relationship between the respondents having positive feelings about the preventive 
training program and the effectiveness of the whole training effort. 
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The Marine Corps should be concerned with ensuring the training participants 
have positive feelings toward the training. As of now, there were too many Marines who 
indicated having negative feelings toward it, which in turn had harmfully impacted the 
overall effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. This was 
definitely an undesirable end state. In order to counter this, the Marine Corps should 
strive to improve the overall quality of the training. By improving the quality of the 
training and thus its image, the overall effectiveness of the training could be enhanced too 
(Kirkpatrick, 2006), which was obviously a desirable end state. 
Finding #7: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' reported efficacy of the trainers and the effectiveness of the combat 
operational stress preventive training. The odds ratio for the efficacy of the trainers was 
17.831. This implied Marines were 17.831 times more likely to consider the combat 
operational stress preventive training as being effective when they indicated the trainers 
who conducted the training were proficient. 
Currently, only 117 out of 480 (24.40 percent) respondents thought of the trainers 
as being fully effective. The associated logistic regression suggested a very strong 
relationship between the efficacy of the trainers and the effectiveness of the whole 
training program. The Marine Corps should be concerned with the quality of the training 
presenters. This was because having effective trainers directly correlated with an eventual 
success of the whole training program as recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). As of 
now, there were too many Marines who did not think very highly of the combat 
operational stress preventive training instructors, which in turn had negatively impacted 
the overall effectiveness of the training. Without doubt, the Marine Corps needed to 
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improve the proficiency of the trainers since having capable and subject matter 
knowledgeable instructors was one of the fundamental requirements for an effective 
preventive training program (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Finding #8: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques 
and the reported effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for learning was 23.999 (p < 
.01). This implied Marines were 23.999 times more likely to consider the combat 
operational stress preventive training as being effective when they indicated they actually 
learned the subject matter skills and techniques. 
Currently, 309 out of 480 (64.40 percent) respondents indicated learning new 
knowledge related to combat operational stress preventive training. However, 171 out of 
480 (36.60 percent), or over one third of the respondents, indicated they did not acquire 
any new knowledge related to combat operational stress preventive training, which 
should be a concern. The associated logistic regression suggested a very strong 
relationship between learning new combat operational stress knowledge and the 
effectiveness of the subject matter training program. The Marine Corps should be 
concerned with the fact the training participants actually learned the subject matter new 
knowledge. This was because learning new combat operational stress knowledge strongly 
correlated with the success of the whole training program, as shown by the associated 
logistic regression. As of now, there were too many Marines who did not consider their 
combat operational stress preventive learning a success, which in turn had negatively 
impacted the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training program. 
The Marine Corps needed to do a better job at ensuring Marines actually learned new 
170 
knowledge during the training, since learning new subject matter knowledge had such a 
positive consequence upon the overall effectiveness of the combat operational preventive 
training as indicated by this finding's logistic regression. 
Finding #9: The next logistic regression model considered associations between 
the respondents' reaction toward the preventive combat operational stress training and the 
effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for reaction was 57.873 (p < .01). This 
implied Marines were 57.873 times more likely to consider the training as being effective 
when they had positive reaction toward the received training. 
Currently, only 96 out of 480 (20.00 percent) respondents indicated reacting 
positively toward the presented combat operational stress preventive training. The 
associated logistic regression suggested a strong relationship between the positive 
reaction to the presented training and the effectiveness of the whole training effort. The 
Marine Corps should be concerned with Marines positively reacting toward the presented 
training and thus enjoying the training. This was because having a positive reaction to the 
presented training directly correlated with success of the whole training program, as 
suggested by the associated logistic regression and Kirkpatrick (2006). As of now, there 
were too many Marines who did not react favorably to the presented combat operational 
stress preventive training, which in turn had negatively affected the overall effectiveness 
of the training. The presented training format needed to be attractive to Marines in such a 
way, so they would react favorably to the presented training. When Marines react 
favorably and consequently enjoy the training, the whole training program could be then 
positively affected with desirable end states of decreased number of PTSD cases, other 
mental health related disorders, drug and alcohol abuse cases, and instances of intimate 
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partner violence. Table 57 provides a summary of findings used to answer Research 
Questions 2 and 3. 
Table 57 
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Questions 2 and 3 
Key Points For Findings 1 through 9 
Finding #1: Only 96 respondents out of 480 (20.00 percent) considered the Marine Corps 
combat operational stress preventive training either as fully effective or at least 
acceptable. 
Finding #2: When Marines reported using the learned combat operational stress 
preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 13.238 times more likely to indicate the 
subject matter training was effective. 
Finding #3: When Marines reported possessing the combat operational stress coping 
skills, they were 20.557 times more likely to indicate the subject matter training was 
effective. 
Finding #4: When Marines reported participating in the combat operational stress 
preventive formal training, they were 19.058 times more likely to report the subject 
matter training was effective. 
Finding #5: When Marines indicated the combat stress preventive training materials 
were effective, they were 48.182 times more likely to consider the subject matter training 
as effective. Only 84 out of 480 (17.50 percent) respondents considered the current 
format of the subject matter training materials as at least acceptable. 
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Table 57 (continued) 
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Questions 2 and 3 
Key Points For Findings 1 through 9 
Finding #6: When Marines indicated having positive feelings toward the combat 
operational stress preventive training, they were 31.859 times more likely to consider the 
subject matter training as being effective. Only 117 out of 480 (24.40 percent) 
respondents reported having definitely positive feelings about the combat operational 
stress preventive training program. 
Finding #7: When Marines indicated the trainers who conducted the combat operational 
stress preventive training were proficient, they were 17.831 times more likely to consider 
the subject matter training as being effective. Only 117 out of 480 (24.40 percent) 
respondents thought of the trainers as being fully effective. 
Finding #8: When Marines indicated actually learning the subject matter skills and 
techniques, they were 23.999 times more likely to consider the combat operational stress 
preventive training as being effective. 
Finding #9: When Marines positively reacted toward the received combat stress 
preventive training they were 57.873 times more likely to consider the training as being 
effective. Only 96 out of 480 (20.00 percent) respondents indicated reacting positively 
toward the presented combat operational stress preventive training. 
Qualitative Conclusions 
The primary purpose of the study's qualitative segment was to explore the 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training services in order to 
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answer Research Questions 2 and 3. Overall, the qualitative study's participants were 
dissatisfied with the training. This finding applies equally to both officers and enlisted as 
there were no discernible differences of stated opinions between both groups. While the 
current format of the preventive training had been successful in providing some basic 
information about the combat operational stress preventive training, it had not resulted in 
Marines learning specific pragmatic skills that could be readily applied in the field. This 
fact had been confirmed by all the interviewees, who indicated they did not see Marines 
applying learned preventive combat stress skills and techniques in their daily lives. 
Additionally, the observed instructors did not provide any post-training tests, so there 
were no means of measuring whether the participants acquired new knowledge as 
recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). Although some of the participants correctly 
answered a few basic questions from the instructors, this was certainly not enough to 
assess whether in fact all the participants or at least a majority of them actually learned 
the subject matter new knowledge. 
Additionally, any training activity should result in transfer of knowledge with the 
training participants applying the learned skills in real life situations (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
However, other than increasing awareness of the combat operational stress preventive 
training program, the training did not provide the Marines with the specific tools to deal 
with effects of combat operational stress. As mentioned earlier, all the interviewees did 
not see their Marines applying the learned preventive combat stress skills in their daily 
lives, which meant the expected transfer of knowledge did not occur. The researcher 
triangulated this finding with the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), which 
showed consecutive annual increases in new mental health, PTSD, drug, and alcohol 
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abuse cases in the Marine Corps starting at the onset of the 9/11 related hostilities and 
continuing to this date (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). The rising combat operational stress 
casualties indicated the training program participants were having difficulties in applying 
what they had learned in the combat operational stress preventive training program. 
Actual military combat operations often resulted in a rise of mental health 
casualties (Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2008). Early intervention 
practices, such as properly instituted training and education, could result in a decrease of 
mental health occurrences (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 2002; Hall, Cipriano, & 
Bicknell, 1997). Based on this paradigm, it was important the Service properly instituted 
preventive combat operational stress education and training services. Such training 
activities should be effective in teaching and instilling Marines with appropriate 
pragmatic coping skills and techniques as required by the Marine Corps (Gaskin, 2008; 
USMC, 2004). As a result, the newly learned coping skills and techniques could be then 
readily applied in Marines' daily lives. The Marine Corps had preventive education and 
training services in place; however, this study suggested the currently formatted and 
delivered combat operational stress preventive training was not effective in decreasing 
the Marine Corps mental health casualty rates. 
Synopsis of the Conclusions 
In summary, several conclusions resulted from this study. First, the Marines' 
experiences from effects of combat operational stress, evidenced by instances of suffering 
from effects of combat operational stress, influenced how they evaluated the 
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. This study reported 
statistically significant relationships between using the learned preventive combat skills 
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in Marines' daily lives, possessing combat operational stress coping skills, participating 
in combat operational stress preventive training classes, reporting the effectiveness of the 
combat operational stress preventive training program, and admitting to having suffered 
from effects of combat operational stress. This implied the combat operational stress 
preventive training program does significantly influence Marines in admitting they had 
combat operational stress related problems. This finding was also beneficial in terms of 
Marines' ability to seek the needed mental health therapy. By virtue of being better 
informed about the combat operational stress concepts and principles, they should be 
much better prepared to voluntarily seek and then get the needed help from mental health 
professionals. This positive effect of the combat operational stress preventive training had 
also been one of the main goals of the preventive combat operational stress training 
(Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007). 
Second, the current state of the program does not seem to be fully effective in 
having Marines, regardless of rank, use the learned combat skills in their daily lives 
which also negatively impacts the effectiveness of the whole training program. These 
claims have been evidenced by several descriptive statistics and associated significant 
logistic regression models. Specifically, the study reported statistically significant 
relationships between Marines using the newly acquired combat operational stress 
preventive knowledge in their daily lives, possessing preventive coping skills, 
participating in combat operational stress preventive classes, positively reacting toward 
the presented training, actually learning new combat operational stress related 
knowledge, the efficacy of the combat operational stress training materials, having 
176 
positive feelings toward the combat operational stress training program, reported 
proficiency of the trainers, and the effectiveness of the whole training program. 
These findings strongly imply the whole program was significantly dependent on 
Kirkpatrick's (2006) evaluation of the training effectiveness constructs. In order for the 
program to be fully effective, Marines needed to positively react to the presented training, 
and then they needed to learn new knowledge associated with the preventive combat 
operational stress training. After they successfully acquired this new knowledge, they 
needed to incorporate the learned skills and techniques into their daily lives by actually 
using this newly developed proficiency on a daily basis. Only then, the whole program 
might achieve its intended overarching goal of fewer cases of mental health problems, 
fewer alcohol and drug related incident cases, and fewer instances of intimate partner 
violence amongst the active duty Marines. 
Unfortunately, the current state of the combat operational stress prevention 
training program had not been fully effective. Both quantitative and qualitative inquiries 
revealed the fact that only a relatively small number of Marines reacted positively and 
consequently enjoyed the training. There were some Marines who learned basic facts 
about the combat operational stress, but only a small number of them indicated using this 
new knowledge in their daily lives. Finally, the majority of the Marines indicated the 
whole combat operational stress preventive training program had not been fully effective. 
This fact had been triangulated by the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) 
which indicated consecutive rises in PTSD, drug, and alcohol related mental health cases 




Based upon the outcomes of this study, several recommendations are proposed. 
The first set of recommendations addresses using the study's findings to guide immediate 
corrective suggestions for improving the current state of the Marine Corps combat 
operational stress preventive program. The next recommendations concern future 
research in the area of combat operational stress preventive training and education 
services. 
Implementing Findings of the Study 
This study's findings can be implemented in several ways. First, the researcher 
needs to share the study's findings with the Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress 
Control branch officers. The goal of sharing the findings with the officers is to enhance 
the current combat operational stress preventive training and education services. Findings 
will be shared through face-to-face presentations to the entire branch staff and the 
Combat Operational Stress Control program Director. By virtue of personally making the 
presentations, the researcher will make the program officers aware of the shortcomings in 
the current state of the combat operational stress preventive training and education 
services discovered or confirmed by this study. By knowing and fully understanding the 
discrepancies, the program officers will be able to take corrective actions in order to 
improve the subject matter training program. 
Some of the noted discrepancies included using inadequate training materials 
consisting of static Microsoft® PowerPoint™ slides. A number of the respondents, 
observed trainees, and interviewees indicated the presented training material was 
inherently dull, unattractive, and non-engaging. As a result, a majority of the respondents 
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did not react favorably to the training. Despite two thirds of the respondents indicated 
learning the basic combat operational stress related concepts, a majority of the 
respondents did not use the learned skills in their daily lives. Consequently, the whole 
combat operational stress training program was not fully effective, as suggested by this 
study's quantitative and qualitative inquiries. 
Doctrinally, the Marine Corps trains as it fights which means individual Marines 
are expected to use the learned knowledge pragmatically in the field and if applicable in 
their daily lives (USMC, 2004). Presently, the preventive combat operational stress 
training program has fallen short of this goal. The Marine Corps leaders need to strive 
and encourage Marines assigned under them to use the learned combat operational stress 
preventive skills and techniques in their daily lives. As more Marines practice what they 
learn, eventually the whole preventive training program should improve in terms of 
discernible decreases in new mental health related cases which include fewer new 
instances of PTSD, fewer new cases of other combat operational stress related mental 
health maladies, fewer drug and alcohol abuse cases, and fewer instances of intimate 
partner violence. 
The Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control branch officers need to 
start the program improvement with the actual training process. Per the Marine Corps 
training doctrine, the combat operational stress preventive training needs to be rank and 
grade focused and standardized across the Marine Corps to include all formal schools, 
pre-deployment training requirements, and sustainment training (USMC, 2004). 
Additionally, in order to facilitate the current world-wide operations, it is recommended 
to develop alternative training means, such as interactive internet resources, situational 
vignettes, videos, and other best practice training solutions to enhance and expand the 
training program quality, accessibility, and consistency. 
It is fascinating that instructional technology might be the key to the future for 
improved combat operational stress preventive training. For instance, web-based 
applications accessible anywhere, anytime could be an answer to distributed operations 
faced by many Marine Corps units deployed in support of combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Web-based asynchronous presentations and situational vignettes would be 
reused many times by thousands of Marines. This reuse factor would drive the overall 
costs down - a great benefit of the information technology. Moreover, the training 
presentations and situational vignettes should be interactive in nature to reinforce the 
learning process and boost the retention rates as much as possible as recommended by 
Knowles (1984). Additionally, there should be computer-based training (CBT) available 
through digital video discs (DVDs) which could be used in situations when the Internet 
connectivity is spotty or just not available. This is especially true in forward deployed 
situations. By having available DVD-based training materials, forward deployed troops 
would simply insert DVDs into their unit training laptops and conduct the needed training 
as appropriate. 
Combat operational stress preventive training based on state of the art 
instructional technology has a chance of becoming a force-multiplier by virtue of its 
flexibility and reusability. This is because today's instructional technology provides the 
capability for training and education that is continuous and accessible 24/7 anywhere in 
the world. Combat Operational Stress Control is a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary 
approach to prevent, identify, and manage the adverse effects of combat operational 
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stress on the physical, psychological, social, and spiritual health of Marines (Gaskin, 
2008; Nash, 2007). Likewise, instructional technology based combat operational stress 
preventive training also needs to be comprehensive and multi-faceted to mirror the multi-
disciplinary approach to the combat stress preventive training. 
State of the art instructional technology delivery methods allow for a high degree 
of interactivity and simulations which translate into a successful memory retention of the 
associated learning material (Knowles, 1984). The technology enhanced training would 
teach the basics of the expected, predictable, emotional, intellectual, physical, and 
behavioral reactions to combat operational stress. Such training would stress the 
employment of effective leadership, enhancement of unit cohesion, morale, and effectual 
interpersonal communications. Instructional technology could be the enabler to achieve 
these goals. All of this could be accomplished with less bureaucracy and more flexibility 
directly benefiting the Marine Corps' greatest and most important resources - the 
individual Marines. 
In order to achieve these goals, the Combat Operational Stress Control branch 
officers need to revamp the current training format in such a way that it is truly 
interesting, captivating, and engaging as judged by the program's ultimate customers, the 
individual Marines. When more Marines start to react positively to the presented training, 
in most likelihood, they will learn more effectively with increased memory retention 
rates. By knowing more about the combat operational stress preventive concepts and with 
preventive skills and techniques committed to the long-term memory, Marines should be 
more prone to use the learned skills and techniques in their daily lives. Only then, the 
whole program could become more effective as evidenced by discernible decreases in 
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new PTSD cases, fewer new other mental health problems and illnesses, fewer drug and 
alcohol abuse cases, and fewer instances of intimate partner violence. 
Future Research 
Based on the study's findings, several follow-on studies are recommended. First, 
another study which would compare longitudinally whether the Marine Corps combat 
operational stress preventive training has in fact improved, providing the Service 
incorporated the suggestions derived and described by this study. Second, each sister 
Service (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force) has also been required by the 
Department of Defense to institute their own combat operational stress preventive 
training programs (Department of Defense, 1999). It is recommended to conduct an 
assessment of each of the Services respective combat operational stress preventive 
training programs to determine their effectiveness or ineffectiveness. As a value added 
benefit of such assessments, best practices derived from the Service specific program 
reviews could be then shared through a peer-reviewed published article. Third, each 
military service has its own special and elite groups (e.g., Special Forces in the Army, the 
Navy SEALs, or fighter pilots in the Air Force). It is interesting to find out how each 
specific military service branch deals with combat operational stress inherently and 
undoubtedly found within the rank and file of these special military groups. 
The recommendations described in this study have a strong potential to result in 
perceptible improvements of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive 
training program. And utmost importantly, the recommendations have a potential to 
directly benefit our Nation's individual Marines, thus directly contribute to their mental 
health well being. This is significant because having fully mentally fit Marines also 
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holistically contributes to both preservation of the Marine Corps forces and the overall 
combat readiness of the Marine Corps (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007). It is the Marine 
Corps' best interest to incorporate the study's recommendations. The implementation of 
the recommendations would also meet expectations of the American public who in good 
faith entrusted their daughters and sons into the Marine Corps care and thus justifiably 
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APPENDIX A 
Effectiveness of Combat Operational Stress Preventive Training Survey 
Marines: 
You are invited to participate in the Effectiveness of Preventive Combat Operational 
Stress Control Training survey. The purpose of the survey is to assess the effectiveness 
of combat operational stress preventive training services. The survey is completely 
anonymous. Your participation in this study is voluntary. Participation in the survey 
poses minimal risk since subject's responses are anonymous and cannot be traced to an 
individual. By completing this survey you acknowledge that you understand the purpose 
of this research and that you are willing to participate. 
Thank you very much for your time and support. If you wish to participate, please start 
the survey now by clicking on the Continue button below. 

















How old are you? 
| | 18-19 
I I 20-25 
I | 26-30 




51 or more 
How many years in the military? 
I I 1-5 
I I 6-10 
I I 11-15 
I I 16-20 
• 21-25 
25 and more 
What is your gender? 
| | Male 
I I Female 
What is your rank? 
| | Enlisted (E-1 through E-3) 
I I Non-commissioned Officer 
I I Staff Non-commissioned Officer 
I I Warrant Officer 
Commissioned Officer 
What is your component status? 
| | Active Duty (AD) 
I 1 Active Duty Reserve (AR) 
I I Selected Reserve (Mobilized) 
I 1 Selected Reserve (Drilling) 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 
Have you ever attended combat operational stress preventive training classes? 
I I Yes 
I I No 
What were your impressions of the training received? 
Poor Neutral Outstanding 
• • • • n 
Did you learn specific principles, facts, and techniques during the training? 
| | Yes 
I I No 
Did you actually use any of the learned skills and techniques? 
• Yes 
I I No 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the training? 
Poor Neutral Outstanding 
• • • n • 
Have you ever suffered from the effects of combat operational stress? 
• Yes 
I I No 
Was the received combat operational stress preventive training effective in helping you cope with 
the effects of combat operational stress? 
No Neutral Yes 
n n • • • 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the currently used combat operational stress preventive 
training materials? 
Poor Neutral Outstanding 
• • • • • 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the trainers who actually presented the combat operational 
stress preventive training material? 
Poor Neutral Outstanding 
• • • • • 
What are your overall feelings about the combat operational stress preventive training program? 
Poor Neutral Outstanding 
• • • • • 
APPENDIX B 
Interview Protocol 
Combat Operational Stress Preventive Training 
The following steps need to be taken in order to schedule and conduct interviews 
concerning combat operational stress preventive training sessions. 
Schedule the interview with the Marine a week before the interview needs to be 
conducted. The already scheduled interview needs to be confirmed three days before the 
actual day to include the meeting time and place. 
On the day and time of the interview, meet the Marine, introduce yourself, and establish 
rapport. 
"The Marine Corps Operational Stress Control branch would like to know more 
about your personal experiences concerning previously conducted combat 
operational stress preventive training. I would like to talk with you to learn about 
your experiences during the training and if the training and education you received 
helped you cope with stress during the actual combat deployment overseas." 
"I would like to tape record our conversation if that is okay with you, so that I will 
have an accurate record. Our conversation will be confidential. I will not use your 
name in any discussions or in any writings related to the research. Only group data 
will be reported. Is that okay?" 
<Be sure to voice record the above paragraphs and the student's answer.> 
"Do you have any questions about this project? Shall we begin?" 
1. "As I understand, you had an opportunity to attend combat operational stress 
preventive training. What were your impressions of the training you received? 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use if Marines cannot think of any experiences 
or do not mention these areas: 
• Classroom settings 
• Quality of training materials 
• Audio-visuals 
• Time of day of the training 
• Interesting training topic 
• Relevance of the training topic 
2. 'Can you tell me what specific principles, facts, and techniques did you 
learn?" 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any 
experiences or do not mention these areas: 
• After action reviews 
• Stigma reduction 
• Resiliency training 
• Stress inoculation 
• Cohesion building 
• Family peer support 
• Family stress reduction 
• Decompression 
• Small unit support and discussions 
• Return and reunion preparation 
• Peer and self-assessment for stress 
• Sustain unit support 
3. "What are your thoughts on actually using knowledge acquired during the 
training? Could you also comment on presumably changed behavior in yourself and 
your peers resulting from the received training?" 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any 
experiences or do not mention these areas: 
• Well trained and confident 
• Fit and tough 
• High level of unit cohesiveness 
• Professional preparedness 
• Taking care of younger and less experienced 
• Boosting confidence in others 
4. "Could you provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of the received 
training? Specifically, please comment on your personal feelings on the conducted 
training and if the training resulted in actual tangible results?" 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any 
experiences or do not mention these areas: 
• Less unit mental health casualties 
• More unit cohesiveness 
• Remaining calm and steady 
• Being confident in self and others 
Getting the job done 
Remaining in control physically, mentally, and emotionally 
Behaving ethically and morally 
Retaining a sense of humor 
Sleeping enough 
Eating the right amount 
Working out and staying fit 
Playing well and often 
Remaining active socially and spiritually 
5. "In what ways did the received training help you cope with the effects of 
combat operational stress while being deployed?" 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any 
expectations or do not mention these areas: 
Exposure to combat situations 
Exposure to live fire 
Convoy operations 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
Hand to hand combat 
Invisible enemy 
Who is the friend or foe? 
Loneliness 
Separation from loved ones 
Family problems back home 
Extreme weather (hot during the day and cold during the night) 
6. "Currently combat operational stress control training packages consist of 
static PowerPoint slides. Please, provide some thoughts and comments on the 
effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of such a training format? 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any 
experiences or do not mention these areas: 
• Static PowerPoint slides 
• Hands-on "active" training 
• Simulations 
• Role playing 
• Instructor relaying teaching material to his or her combat experiences 
• Retention of presented materials 
7. "Could you provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of the trainers who 
actually presented the combat operational stress preventive training materials?" 
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Topics to be used for probing questions to use if students cannot think of any experiences 
or do not mention these areas: 
• Presentation skills 
• Ability to keep audience motivated 
• Appropriate tone of speaking voice 
• Respect toward the audience 
• Breaks offered every hour on the hour of the training 
8. "What are your overall personal feelings about the combat operational stress 
preventive training not covered in previous questions?" 
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any 
experiences or do not mention these areas: 
• Pre-deployment training requirements 
• Class and the instructor 
• Quality of training package 
• Material easy to understand? 
• Presentation material as a motivational catalyst toward the program 
• Is it something useful or just another typical military brief? 
"Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. Is there anything else you 






1. Instructor is on time or students loitering in 
hallway 
2. General demeanor of instructor 
a. Appears prepared, happy to be in class, 
or hurried, nervous, visibly not confident. 
3. Appearance of instructor and military students 
a. Appropriate military or civilian attire 
4. Sociability of the instructor 
a. Enthusiastically greets students or shuns 
away 
b. Readily accessible to students, willing to 
answer student questions 
c. Topics of conversations relate to combat 
stress or are more of personal nature 
5. Readiness of room 
a. Overhead projector and computer 
equipment working, white board, 
general classroom cleanliness, furniture 
During class 
1. Orderly beginning 
a. Instructor able to proceed with the 
instruction without any delays 
b. Students attentive and eager to proceed 
2. Instructor 
a. Seem self-confident or rather tentative 
b. Profound subject matter knowledge 
c. Open to questions from students 
d. Skillfully manages interruptions 
e. Skillfully delivers quality instruction 
f. Talks to the slides 
3. Students 
a. Giving attention to the instructor 
b. Seem interested or visibly bored 
c. Sidebar conversations 
d. Genuinely serious or flippant 
e. Asking pertinent questions or silent 
4. Equipment 
a. Instructor being comfortable with the 




End of class 
1. End on time, early, or late 
2. Wrap up 
a. Goes over the major points 
b. Any questions from students about the 
combat stress preventive training 
program - instructor's ability to answer 
3. Instructor 
a. Students dismissal procedures 
b. Instructor rushes from room or remains 
available to students 
c. Topics of conversations 
i. Combat stress related or rather 
personal 
4. Students 
a. Seem comfortable with the instructor 
b. Conversations or comments to fellow 
students about combat stress preventive 
training class experience, or something 
unrelated 
c. Extend farewell greeting to the instructor 




Quantitative Survey Questions and Levels of Training Evaluation 
Quantitative Survey Question 
What were your impressions of the training 
received? 
Did you learn specific principles, facts, and 
techniques during the training? 
Did you actually use any of the learned 
skills and techniques? 
How would you rate the effectiveness of 
the training? 







Qualitative Interview Questions and Levels of Training Evaluation 
Qualitative Interview Question 
As I understand, you had an opportunity to 
attend combat operational stress control 
training sessions. What were your 
impressions of the training you received? 
Can you tell me what specific principles, 
facts, and techniques did you learn? 
What are your thoughts on actually using 
knowledge acquired during the training? 
Could you also comment on presumably 
changed behavior in yourself and your 
peers resulting from the received training? 
Could you provide some thoughts on the 
effectiveness of the received training? 
Specifically, please comment on your 
personal feelings on the conducted training 
and if the training resulted in actual 
tangible outcomes? 
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